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COMMENT
United States v. Knox: Protecting Chil-
dren from .Sexual Exploitation Through
the Federal Child Pornography Laws
INTRODUCTION
A new type of child pornography has emerged in the past few
years.' Pornographers, seeking to avoid prosecution under a federal
criminal statute, are now using children to produce "panty-flashing"
videotapes which do not feature nudity or explicit sexual acts but
depict fully or partially clothed children posing while the camera
zooms in and focuses for extended periods of time on their covered
genital and pubic areas.2 These exploitative materials are then
marketed to pedophiles3 who view these materials for their sexual
gratification.4  Catalogues advertising such tapes pander to
pedophiles with film descriptions such as "girls between the ages
of 11 and 17 showing so much panty and ass you'll get dizzy" and
"bathing suits on girls as young as 15 that are so revealing it's
1. See infra notes 347-348 and accompanying text. Child pornography is currently
defined under federal legislation as visual depictions of children engaging in sexually
explicit conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). "Sexually explicit
conduct" is defined by statute as including "lascivious exhibitions of the genitals or pubic
area." 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The materials are not required
to be considered obscene. See infra note 101 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the
Attorney General's Office has stated that what is commonly referred to as child pornogra-
phy is not so much a form of pornography as it is a form of sexual exploitation of chil-
dren. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
FINAL REPORT 405 (1986) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
2. See, e.g., United States v. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 817 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 2926, vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993), aff'd, 32 F.3d 733 (3d
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL 512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995).
3. The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography defined a pedophile as a
person who has "a clear sexual preference for children." FINAL REPORT, supra note 1,
at 609.
4. Knox, 977 F.2d at 818.
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almost like seeing them naked (some say even better)."5
United States v. Knox6 addresses the issue of whether Congress
intended to prohibit these sorts of visual depictions when it enacted
the federal child pornography laws. In Knox, federal prosecutors
successfully argued that the federal child pornography laws prohib-
ited such depictions when they prosecuted Stephen A. Knox for
knowingly receiving and possessing child pornography in violation
of the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of
1977, as amended by the Child Protection Act of 1984 ("Act").7
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsyl-
vania rejected Knox's claim that the videotapes in his possession
did not depict a "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area"
of a minor, a form of "sexually explicit conduct" which is pro-
scribed by the Act.8
In 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit upheld Knox's conviction.9 Knox subsequently appealed the
conviction to the United States Supreme Court.'° In March 1993,
the Acting Solicitor General, William C. Bryson, filed a Supreme
Court brief on behalf of the U.S. Justice Department, seeking to
uphold the conviction.' The Justice Department argued that
Knox's conviction should stand because the videotapes confiscated
from Knox's apartment were found by the court of appeals to con-
tain "lascivious exhibitions" and because nudity of the child is not
a requirement under the Act.' 2
In September 1993, President Clinton's newly appointed Solici-
tor General, Drew S. Days, III, filed a different brief, which re-
5. Id.
6. 776 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Pa. 1991), aff'd, 977 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 2926 (1993), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993), aff'd, 32
F.3d 733 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL 512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995).
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2257 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
8. Knox, 776 F. Supp. at 174, 180. These terms are defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a),
2256(2)(E) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See also infra part I.A.5.
9. Knox, 977 F.2d at 817.
10. Knox v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2926 (1993).
11. Brief for the United States in Opposition, Knox (No. 92-1183) [hereinafter United
States' Brief (Bryson)].
12. United States' Brief (Bryson) at 6-10. See infra part II.B.2.
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versed the Justice Department's earlier position. 3 The new brief
contended that the Third Circuit used "an impermissibly broad
standard" in interpreting and applying the Act and that the convic-
tion of Knox should be vacated" 4 The Justice Department's new
position was that a prohibited depiction must contain two elements:
(a) the material must include a visible depiction of the geni-
tals or pubic area of the body (as distinguished from a de-
piction of the clothing covering those areas); and
(b) the material must depict a child lasciviously engaging
in sexual conduct (as distinguished from lasciviousness on
the part of the photographer or consumer).' 5
In light of the Justice Department's new position, the Supreme
Court vacated the Third Circuit's decision and remanded the case
to the Third Circuit for further consideration.'
6
Anti-pornography groups and members of Congress criticized
the Clinton Administration for the Justice Department's reversal. 7
President Clinton then personally directed Attorney General Janet
Reno to draft an amendment to expand the reach of the federal
child pornography laws.' 8 Although Reno drafted a proposed
amendment to the Act, 19 no member of Congress sponsored or
promoted its passage since many House and Senate members be-
13. Brief for the United States, Knox (No. 92-1183) [hereinafter United States' Brief
(Days)]. William C. Bryson, appointed by President George Bush, was serving as the
Acting Solicitor General under the Clinton Administration when the Justice Department
filed its first United States Supreme Court brief in Knox. Drew S. Days, III, the present
Solicitor General, was subsequently appointed by President Clinton. Days then filed a
second Supreme Court brief in Knox, which reversed the earlier position taken by the
government. United States' Brief (Days).
On March 17, 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno named Bryson to become the
acting Associate Attorney General to replace Webster L. Hubbell, who had recently re-
signed from that position. No. 3 Justice Official to Step Down Today, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
18, 1994, at A16.
14. United States' Brief (Days) at 8-9. See infra part II.B.3.
15. United States' Brief (Days) at 9.
16. United States v. Knox, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993).
17. Top Court Agrees to Hear Porn Case, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 1, 1994, at IlA.
18. Neil A. Lewis, Clinton to Widen Law on Child Smut, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993,
at A24.
19. See infra text accompanying note 288.
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lieved that the material in Knox's possession was already covered
under the present statute.20
The shifting theories of the Justice Department divided com-
mentators and lawyers into two camps. Those in support of the
Justice Department's new position stated that this interpretation of
the statute was an attempt to keep it from being declared unconsti-
tutionally overbroad. 2' They voiced their concerns that a broader
interpretation of the statute would infringe upon First Amendment
rights, especially with regard to advertisements.22 Those against
the new position argued that the Justice Department's interpretation
set forth in its second Supreme Court brief was narrower than it
was under the Bush and Reagan administrations and that it did not
adequately interpret the statute or protect children from sexual
exploitation.23
On June 9, 1994, the Third Circuit, on remand, reaffirmed
Knox's conviction and rejected the Justice Department's new stan-
dard.24 The court held that nudity or discernibility of the child's
pubic area is not a requirement under the statute, and that a "lasciv-
ious exhibition" of a child's pubic area "requires only that the ma-
terial depict some 'sexually explicit conduct' by the minor subject
which appeals to the lascivious interest of the intended audience.,
25
Knox again appealed his conviction to the United States Supreme
20. Martin Dyckman, Politics and Pornography, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 23,
1993, at 9A. Furthermore, the Senate passed a resolution authorizing members of Con-
gress to file an amicus brief to the Third Circuit to argue that the Justice Department's
new standard misinterpreted the Act. 140 CONG. REC. S354-01 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Grassley). Two hundred and thirty-four members of Congress were
granted amicus status in the case. United-States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 741 n.7 (3d Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL 512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995).
21. See Lewis, supra note 18, at A24.
22. Id. See Lawrence A. Stanley, The Child Porn Storm: How One Curious Legal
Case Caused a Capitol Hill Stampede, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1994, at C3 (asserting that
finding Knox guilty on the basis of interpretations developed expressly for his case is a
clear injustice driven by political imperatives).
23. See 140 CONG. REC. S354-01 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Grassley); see also William V. Roth, Protecting the Child Victims of Porn, WASH. POST,
Mar. 2, 1994, at A17.
24. United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 747 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL
512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995).
25. Id. at 747.
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Court. However, on January 17, 1995, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.26 The Justice Department's most recent brief rejected its
interpretation of the Act set forth in its second brief that nudity or
discernability is required for a conviction.27 The latest brief stated
that "neither nudity nor discernibility of the genitals through cloth-
ing is a requirement of the offense."28
The.extended controversy surrounding the Knox case highlights
the difficulties encountered when legislators attempt to define child
pornography and underscores the consequences of imprecise legis-
lative drafting. It also demonstrates the creativity of child pornogr-
aphers in attempting to evade such legislation. Additionally, the
controversy confronts a factual situation which the framers of the
Act may not have fully contemplated at the time of drafting: the
sexual exploitation of children where the children are clothed and
their genitals and pubic areas are fully covered.
Another issue raised in Knox is whether the rule of lenity
should apply in this situation. The rule of lenity requires that an
ambiguous criminal statute be interpreted in favor of the defen-
dant.29 However, the rule of lenity is reserved for those situations
in which "reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope
even after resort to 'the language and structure, legislative history,
and motivating policies' of the statute., 30 This Comment demon-
strates that, after an examination of these elements, the Act undou-
btedly covers Knox's conduct. It argues that the courts must con-
tinue to apply the interpretation of the Third Circuit on remand to
fulfill the Act's congressional aim.31 To do otherwise would pro-
26. Linda Greenhouse, Court Rejects Appeal of Man Convicted in Child Smut Case
with Political Overtones, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1995, at D20.
27. Linda Greenhouse, U.S. Changes Stance in Case on Obscenity: Conservative
Views in High Court Brief, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1994, at A15.
28. Id.
29. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985).
30. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (quoting Bifulco v. United
States, 477 U.S. 381, 387 (1980)); see also United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347
(1971) (the Court should rely on the rule of lenity only if, "[a]fter 'seiz[ing] everything
from which aid can be derived,"' it is "left with an ambiguous statute." (quoting United
States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.))).
31. See infra notes 350-353 and accompanying text. The author agrees with the
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vide a significant loophole in the Act, allowing imaginative child
pornographers to carry on their business with impunity, and thereby
frustrate the Act's intended purpose.
This Comment will demonstrate that the Third Circuit's most
recent decision is consistent with the Act. The language chosen by
Congress in formulating the Act, although never before applied to
"lascivious exhibitions" of children whose genitals are covered,
does protect against this type of sexual exploitation of children and
is consistent with the aim and purpose intended by Congress for
this legislation. The interpretation of the Act adopted in the Justice
Department's second brief, on the other hand, deviates from the
standards for child pornography set forth in case law and frustrates
the Act's intended purpose: to eradicate the business of child por-
nography and to protect children from harmful sexual exploitation.
Faced with this new type of child pornography, the courts should
continue to uphold the legislative aim of the Act in a manner simi-
lar to the Third Circuit's decision on remand, and thereby utilize
the proper, albeit expansive, interpretation of the Act which prohib-
its the type of pornographic materials at issue in Knox.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the legislative
history of the Act and its recent amendments, particularly the sec-
tions defining "sexually explicit conduct" and the case law that has
interpreted these sections. Part II first discusses the factual setting
and procedural history of United States v. Knox and presents the
arguments of the parties. It then examines the reactions and com-
ments of members of the Senate and House to the Justice Depart-
ment's second brief and the Clinton Administration's proposed
amendment. Finally, Part II sets forth the Third Circuit's decision
on remand. Part III analyzes the Third Circuit's decision on re-
mand, as well as the intent and purpose of the Act, focusing on the
conflicting theories present in the Knox case. It argues that, given
the congressional intent behind the Act and in light of recent case
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on remand that the
rule of lenity does not apply in Knox. See infra notes 343, 361-362 and accompanying
text. A more detailed discussion of the rule of lenity and why it would not apply in this
case falls outside the scope of this Comment.
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law, the Third Circuit's rejection of the Justice Department's new
standard was proper, and that the court's interpretation and analysis
of the Act was essentially correct. It explains that such conflicting
interpretations of the Act are due to the imprecise language of the
Act, the unique situation in the Knox case, and the difficulty that
courts have had in defining what constitutes child pornography.
Part III also contends that there are further indicia, not considered
by the Third Circuit's decision on remand, to support an interpreta-
tion of the Act that covers the types of exploitative materials at
issue in Knox. This Comment concludes that Knox's conviction
was proper and that the courts should continue to apply the Third
Circuit's interpretation of the statute, which effectively reaches
pornographers who create sexually exploitative depictions of chil-
dren that are purposely designed to escape liability under the Act.
Such an interpretation fulfills the congressional intent behind the
Act and is supported by case law on the Act and on child pornog-
raphy generally.32
32. The author recognizes that constitutional issues may be raised when an expansive
interpretation is applied to facts different from those in the Knox case. For example, an
expansive interpretation may raise questions as to whether the Act would then also pro-
hibit innocuous photos of children taken by family members which inadvertently focus
on a child's covered pubic area. The author believes that such depictions would not
constitute a violation of the Act because there would be no finding of lasciviousness by
a reasonable court or jury using the factors enunciated in United States v. Dost. 636 F.
Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Weigand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987). See discussion infra part I.B.
Furthermore, photographs taken surreptitiously of a clothed child by a pedophile
using a zoom lens which are reproduced, marketed and distributed as child pornography
may also sexually exploit a child depending on the nature and circumstances of the
depictions. Although the interest in protecting the child from psychological trauma may
not be as compelling as if the child was aware of the photographer, it is fair to say that
such exploitative depictions may cause future psychological harm to the child if he or she
discovers the existence of such depictions.
The author does not attempt to address all of the constitutional issues raised by
interpreting the federal child pornography statute to prohibit "lascivious exhibitions" of
clothed children. Rather, this Comment is primarily concerned with exploitative depic-
tions of clothed children who are not engaged in sexual acts, but are being directed in
some fashion and obviously portrayed as sexual objects, and which can fairly be said to
"lasciviously exhibit" the genitals or pubic areas of children.
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I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CASE LAW OF THE ACT
A. Overview of the Federal Child Pornography Laws
1. The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation
Act of 1977
Until 1977, there was no federal statute prohibiting the use of
children in the production of materials that depicted explicit sexual
conduct. 33  Prior to the mid-1970s, prosecutors "had relied upon
state rape, incest and child welfare statutes to punish those who
sexually exploited children. 34 Despite these laws, the child por-
nography industry flourished.35 During the 1970s, however, the
public became more aware of the nationwide child pornography
problem when law enforcement authorities exposed several child
pornography rings 36 and author-researcher Robin Lloyd published
a book about prostitution among young boys in the United States.37
As a result of increased public concern, the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees in 1977 began to investigate the child por-
nography industry. 38 Based upon these investigations, the Commit-
33. Todd J. Weiss, Note, The Child Protection Act of 1984: Child Pornography and
the First Amendment, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 327, 334 (1985). The apparent reason for
a lack of attention to child pornography prior to the 1970s was that it only began to
surface as a national concern at that time. Id. at 331. For a detailed discussion of the
history and effectiveness of the first federal child pornography law, see generally David
P. Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 535 (1981).
34. Shouvlin, supra note 33, at 537-38.
35. Id. The increase in sexual exploitation of children was attributed to "the lack of
legislative prohibitions, the failure of law enforcement and the courts, and the breakdown
of the family unit." Id. at 537 (citing NATIONAL COMM'N FOR PREVENTION OF CHILD
ABUSE, BASIC FACTS ABOUT SEXUAL CHILD ABUSE (1978)).
36. In 1973, police discovered the sexually sadistic murders of twenty-seven young
boys by Dean Corll, who ran one of several call-boy rings exposed that year. Lisa S.
Smith, Private Possession of Child Pornography: Narrowing At-Home Privacy Rights,
1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1011, 1013 n.19 (citing FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 599
n.398). During the next few years, reporters and investigators discovered many instances
of child sexual exploitation, including child pornography. Id. In 1976, two employees
of a publisher of sexually-oriented materials were convicted of pandering, because they
paid a fourteen-year-old girl to be photographed performing sexual intercourse. Id.
37. Shouvlin, supra note 33, at 537-38 (citing ROBIN LLOYD, FOR MONEY OR LOVE:
BOY PROSTITUTION IN AMERICA (1976)).
38. Hearings were held from May to September 1977 by the House Subcommittee
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tee concluded:
(1) That child pornography and child prostitution have
become highly organized, multimillion dollar industries that
operate on a nationwide scale.
(2) That the use of children as prostitutes or as the subjects
of pornographic materials is very harmful to both the chil-
dren and to society as a whole.
(3) That such prostitution and the sale and distribution of
such pornographic materials are carried on to a substantial
extent through the mails and other instrumentalities of inter-
state and foreign commerce, and
(4) That existing federal laws dealing with prostitution and
pornography do not protect against the use of children in
these activities, and that specific legislation in this area is
both advisable and needed.39
The Senate Judiciary Committee conducted hearings ("1977
Hearings") to examine the need for federal child pornography legis-
lation and the specific language to be used in the new federal legis-
lation criminalizing the production of child pornography.40 Al-
on the Judiciary, the Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee on
Education and Labor, and the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 600 & n.403.
39. S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
40, 42-43 (numerals added). The Senate Judiciary Committee also examined the profile
of the typical sexually exploited child. Investigations revealed that the child victims are
usually runaways who came to urban areas with little or no money. Id. at 8, reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 45. The Committee estimated that there were between seven
hundred thousand and one million children who ran away from home each year; thus, it
was not difficult for pedophiles to find child models or prostitutes. Id. Pedophiles and/or
pornographers would offer the children money or drugs-or, in the case of small children,
candy or a meal-in return for participation in sexual activity or pornography. Id.
However, the Committee also found that not all exploited children were runaways; many
lived with their families and attended school. Id. In many instances, their parents did not
provide emotional support or stable environments. Id. In some of the worst cases, the
parents themselves sold their own children for sexual purposes. Id. at 8, reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 46. For additional discussion on the profile of sexually exploited
children, see Shouvlin, supra note.33, at 545.
40. See generally Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the
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though four bills were introduced in the Senate, only two of these
bills were seriously considered during the 1977 Hearings: one by
Senator William V. Roth ("Roth Bill")4' and another by Senators
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. and John C. Culver ("Mathias-Culver
Bill"). 2 The Roth Bill criminalized depictions of children engaged
in "prohibited sexual acts. 43 The definition of "prohibited sexual
acts" included nudity, "if such nudity is to be depicted for the pur-
pose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any individual who
may view such depiction." 44 The Mathias-Culver Bill criminalized
depictions of a minor engaging in "sexually explicit conduct.
45
The definition of "sexually explicit conduct," however, did not
contain a nudity provision, but did include the phrase "lewd exhibi-
tion of the genitals or pubic area.",
46
The Roth Bill's nudity provision was criticized by lawyers and
government officials who testified at the 1977 Hearings.47 For
instance, Assistant Attorney General Patricia Wald, in a letter dated
June 14, 1977, to Senator James 0. Eastland, Chairman of the
Committee on the Judiciary, recommended that:
The term "nudity . . . depicted for the purpose of sexual
stimulation or gratification of any individual who may view
such depiction" is also troublesome. This definition differs
from the "average person" test for obscene material set
forth in Miller v. California, [ ] and it would be difficult to
determine by what standard the "sexual stimulation or grati-
fication" could be assessed. We would suggest as an alter-
native definition "lewd exhibitions of the genitals," a phrase
used by the Chief Justice in Miller v. California, []to de-
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Hearings].
41. S. 1011, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), quoted in 1977 Hearings, supra note 40,
at 75-76.
42. S. 1585, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), quoted in S. CONF. REP. No. 811, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1977). The other two bills introduced were Senate Bills 1499 and
1040. S. REP. No. 438, supra note 39, at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 40.
43. S. 1011, supra note 41, at 75.
44. Id. at 76.
45. S. 1585, supra note 42, at 1-2.
46. S. CONF. REP. No. 811, supra note 42, at 3.
47. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 40, at. 77-78, 103.
[Vol. 5:167
1994] PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 177
scribe one of a variety of types of conduct which could be
prohibited under state obscenity statutes. Congress could
make clear in the legislative history of the bill what types
of nude portrayals of children were intended to be encom-
passed within this definition.48
Wald and others were evidently concerned about the potential over-
breadth of the Roth Bill.49 They believed that only child pornogra-
phy which was considered obscene could constitutionally be
banned.5" They therefore suggested limiting the proscription
against nude portrayals to those that satisfied the qualification of
lewdness.51 Professor Paul Bender, former general counsel to the
President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography in 1970,
also criticized the Roth Bill, noting, in particular, the difficulties
inherent in the application of a sexual gratification test. 2 After the
48. 1977 Hearings, supra note 40, at 77-78 (quoting letter from Wald, Assistant
Attorney General, to Sen. Eastland, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee (June 14,
1977)) (emphasis added).
49. Congressman Edward I. Koch, for example, warned that he would not endorse
a proposal which banned mere nudity because he was "concerned about the breadth of
[that] term." 123 CoNG. REC. H17,227 (1977) (statement of Rep. Koch).
50. 1977 Hearings, supra note 40, at 77-78. There was concern that those materials
that did not satisfy the obscenity test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), would be struck down as unconstitutional. In
Miller, the Court dealt with adult pornography, and in order for materials to be found
obscene under Miller, the trier of fact must find that:
(1) the "'average person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;"
(2) that "the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;" and
(3) that "the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value."
413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted).
Despite the test enunciated in Miller, the difficulties of determining what constitutes
obscenity are still present. A detailed discussion of obscenity and adult pornography,
however, falls outside the scope of this Comment.
51. 1977 Hearings, supra note 40, at 77-78.
52. Id. at 103. Professor Bender's views echoed, in part, those of the Justice Depart-
ment. He stated:
Most importantly [sic], is the definitional section of the Roth bill. It uses
the conduct which it prohibits as having children engage in prohibited sexual
acts and then it defines prohibited sexual acts in a number of ways. Most of
these definitions are okay. But some of them strike me as vague and so vague
as to perhaps be unconstitutional.
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Roth Bill was criticized, Senators Mathias and Culver eschewed the
broad language of the Roth Bill in favor of the term "lewd exhibi-
tion of the genitals or pubic area" in their proposal.53 Congress
ultimately adopted the language of the Mathias-Culver Bill54 when
Congress enacted the first federal child pornography statute, The
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977
("1977 Act").5  Section 2251(a) of the 1977 Act prohibited em-
ploying children under the age of sixteen in the production of sexu-
ally explicit material which was to be mailed or transported in
interstate commerce.56 Section 2252(a) prohibited the knowing
receipt, transportation, or mailing in interstate or foreign commerce,
for the purpose of sale or distribution for sale, of any obscene ma-
The nudity provision is a little bit troublesome also. It says,"nudity: if
such nudity is to be depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratifi-
cation of any individual who may view such depiction." I have a problem with
that in knowing whose purpose they are talking about and when that has to be
the purpose. Is the notion of this that the person taking the picture has to take
the picture for the purpose of stimulating or gratifying someone else sexually,
or is it enough if the picture is simply used that way for that purpose by some-
body later[,] even if that was not the purpose of the person who took the pic-
ture?
Nudity generally, I think, may be a bit overbroad in terms of the purposes
of the legislation. I would not want to qualify as child abuse anyone who takes
a picture of a child without any clothes on. Lots of people do that of their
children. They send it to the child's grandparents in interstate commerce. I
don't think you would want to cover that. So I think it's right to qualify "nudi-
ty. " But this qualification [in the Roth bill] strikes me.as vague.
Id. (emphasis added). Professor Bender did not address the issue of a "sexual gratifi-
cation" test further, and the federal courts were the first to address this issue. See dis-
cussion infra part I.B.
53. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
54. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2256 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
55. Pub. L. No. 95-225, §§ 2251-2253, 2423, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2257 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (Supp. 11 1978). This section provided:
Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any
minor or who has any minor assist any other person to engage in, any sexually
explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual or print medium de-
picting such conduct, shall be punished.., if such person knows or has reason
to know that such visual or print medium has actually been transported in
interstate or foreign commerce or mailed.
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).
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terial depicting a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.57 A
"minor" was defined as "any person under the age of sixteen."58
Congress adopted the definitions of "sexually explicit conduct"
included in the Mathias-Culver Bill in the enacted law.59
2. The Child Protection Act of 1984 and the Removal of
the Obscenity Requirement
a. The Ferber Decision
In 1984, Congress reevaluated the 1977 Act in light of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Ferber.
60
Ferber involved a New York child pornography statute that forbade
producing, selling, lending, exhibiting, or distributing materials
depicting a child under sixteen engaged in sexual conduct. 6' The
statute did not require that such materials be obscene in order to
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (Supp. 111978). This section provided that any person who:
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce or mails, for
the purpose of sale or distribution for sale, any obscene or visual print medium,
if (A) the producing of such visual or print medium involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual or print medium
depicts such conduct; or
(2) knowingly receives for the purpose of sale or distribution for sale or know-
ingly sells or distributes for sale any obscene visual or print medium that has
been transported or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed if (A)
the producing of such visual or print medium involves the use of a minor en-
gaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual or print medium depicts
such conduct; shall be punished ....
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 2253(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
59. Compare S. CONF. REP. No. 811, supra note 42, at 2-3 with 18 U.S.C. § 2253(2)
(Supp. 11 1978). Section 2253(2) defined "sexually explicit conduct" as actual or simulat-
ed--(A) sexual intercourse; (B) bestiality; (C) masturbation; (D) sado-masochistic abuse
(for the purpose of sexual stimulation); (E) lewd exhibition of the genitals or pubic area
of any person. 18 U.S.C. § 2253(2) (Supp. 11 1978). .
60. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
61. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 1980). Because the Miller obscenity
standard frustrated the legislative attack on child pornography, some states began to adopt
different tests for pornography involving children. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at
607; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749 n.2 (listing the nineteen state statutes in addition to New
York's that prohibited the dissemination of material depicting a child engaged in sexual
conduct regardless of whether the material was obscene); see also Weiss, supra note 33,
at 336.
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hold the defendant liable.62 Ferber, a bookstore owner who sold
child pornography which could not be classified as obscene under
the Miller test, was convicted of violating New York's child por-
nography statute. 63  Ferber challenged the statute on grounds that
it was unconstitutional because it banned both obscene and non-
obscene child pornography.'
The Supreme Court in Ferber upheld the constitutionality of the
New York statute.65  The Court reasoned that the overwhelming
state interest in protecting minors from physical and psychological
harm allowed the state greater latitude in regulating child pornogra-
phy than in regulating Other forms of expression.66 The Court also
found that the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of chil-
dren constituted a governmental objective of surpassing importance
which clearly outweighed any slight value this type of expression
might have.67 Thus, the Court "created a new category of unpro-
tected speech 8-child pornography-a development that led [com-
mentators] to conclude that the first amendment was becoming
'codified' and ever more complex., 69
62. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 752.
63. id.
64. Child pornography may be classified as obscene, i.e., that which meets the three-
pronged Miller test, see supra note 50, or non-obscene, i.e., materials illegal under the
applicable state or federal statute but that do not necessarily meet the Miller test for
obscenity. The depictions at issue in Ferber were films of young boys masturbating.
These films were not found to be patently offensive and appealing to the prurient interests
of the average person, as the Miller test requires to find obscenity. Ferber, 458 U.S. at
761; see supra note 50. However, the films did constitute a "sexual performance" of a
child under the applicable state law, and therefore, the defendant was convicted. Ferber,
458 U.S. at 752.
65. 458 U.S. at 774.
66. Id. at 756-57.
67. See id. at 762 ("[tlhe value of permitting live performances ... of children
engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis").
68. Additional categories of unprotected speech include: obscenity, as defined in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); dangerous forms of incitement, as defined
in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); and fighting words, as defined in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
69. See J6rn Axel Holl, Comment, Judges, Congress, and the Sixteen-Year-Old Porn
Star: Questions on the Proper Role of the First Amendment, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1355,
1362 (1990) (citing Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v.
Ferber, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 285, 309); see also Schauer, supra, at 299 ("In sorting out
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In Ferber, the Court made several other findings that were
crucial to the decision. The Court found that the distribution of
photographs and films depicting sexual activity by minors was
intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children in two ways:
(1) the materials were a permanent record of the child's participa-
tion and the harm to the child is increased by its distribution;70 and
(2) a halt to the distribution of child pornography was needed in
order to effectively control the production of materials that featured
the sexual exploitation of children.7 The Court also found that
"[t]he advertising and selling of child pornography provide an eco-
nomic motive for and are thus an integral part of the production of
such materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation. 72 The
Court explained that "[t]he act of selling these materials is guaran-
teeing that there will be additional abuse of children, 73 and speech
is rarely protected when it is "used as an integral part of conduct
in violation of a valid criminal statute. 74 Finally, the Court con-
cluded that "[riecognizing and classifying child pornography as a
category of material outside the protection of the First Amendment
[was] not, incompatible with [its] earlier decisions. 75
The Court set limits, however, on the extent to which child
pornography is unprotected by the First Amendment: (1) "the
conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the [stat-
ute]"; (2) the "offense [must] be limited to works that visually
depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age"; and (3)
"[tihe category of 'sexual conduct' proscribed must also be suitably
limited and described. 76
these multiple paths to nonprotection, we may make major progress toward understanding
both Ferber and the increasingly complex nature of the First Amendment").
70. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
71. Id. at 759-60.
72. Id. at 761.
73. Id. at 761-62 n.13 (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 762 (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 763 (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976)
(stating that "[tihe question whether speech is, or is not, protected by the First Amend-
ment often depends on the content of the speech") and FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 742-48 (1978) (stating that speech may not be entitled to absolute constitutional
protection under all circumstances depending on its context and content)).
76. id. at 764.
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b. Congressional Review of the 1977 Act
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Ferber, which
allowed states to regulate non-obscene child pornography, the
House and Senate Judiciary Committees commenced a review of
the effectiveness of the 1977 Act.77 Loopholes present in the 1977
Act were evident. The House Judiciary Committee noted that pros-
ecutions under the 1977 Act were few 78 and that the utilization of
the 1977 Act had been inhibited by that statute's limited applica-
tion to the commercial distribution of child pornography because
many of these materials were distributed by gift and exchange.79
The Committee also noted that the purpose of the 1977 Act had
been frustrated by the obscenity requirement8 ° because it limited
the types of depictions which could be banned under the statute.8"
The Committee also found that the harm to children exists
whether or not those who initiate pornography schemes are moti-
vated by profit, and therefore decided that the "commercial pur-
77. H.R. REP. No. 536, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 493. This Comment discusses the House Report because Congress
ultimately enacted the new child pornography laws based on a proposal by the House, not
the Senate. The Senate took action first and approved Senate Bill 1469. See 129 CoNG.
REC. 10,208 (1983). The House, however, deliberated for a considerable amount of time
and gleaned various provisions from each House proposal before passing a bill. See infra
note 87 and accompanying text.
78. H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 77, at 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 493.
At the time of the hearings, the number of indictments under § 2252 since May 1977 was
only twenty-eight. Id.
79. Id.; see also Susan G. Caughlan, Private Possession of Child Pornography: The
Tensions Between Stanley v. Georgia and New York v. Ferber, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV.
187, 192 (1987) (noting that the commercial purpose requirement was a major flaw in the
1977 Act); FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 604.
80. See supra note 50.
81. See H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 77, at 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
493. "The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 was based on
First Amendment case law requiring a showing of obscenity as a condition precedent to
a legislative interest in banning child pornography.". Id. at 1-2, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 492-93. The obscenity requirement posed significant hurdles to prosecu-
tion because of its complexity and its narrow scope of application. See Weiss, supra note
33, at 336 (discussing how the Supreme Court had not yet drawn a distinction between
adult and child pornography and Congress was forced to assume that only one standard
existed for all pornography). For further discussion of the practical effects of the obsceni-
ty requirement, see id. at 336-39.
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pose" language should be struck from the 1977 Act. 2 Additional-
ly, the Committee concluded that the age of minors encompassed
by the 1977 Act8 3 should be increased from sixteen years to eigh-
teen years because, in most cases, prosecutions are based on the
pictures alone and it was difficult to show that the child was under
84bsixteen. Thus, by raising the age of the minor to eighteen, the
statute would better enable prosecutors to proceed against violators
with materials involving fifteen-and sixteen-year-olds Finally,
the Committee noted that there was a "need to prosecute the pro-
ducer who pirates photos from other publications or who purchases
photos for reproduction" and that a reproduction offense would be
effective to enable prosecutions.86
The Committee held further hearings on the issue and examined
four bills which were proposed as amendments to the 1977 Act.87
All of the bills had two common elements: (1) the elimination of
the obscenity requirement; and (2) the elimination of the require-
ment that distribution of the materials be for commercial purpos-
es. 8  Three of these bills provided an affirmative defense to prose-
cutions if the material had literary, scientific, artistic, or social
value.89 The Committee considered the bills before it and proposed
82. H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 77, at 2-3, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 493-
94. The 1977 Act specified that the depictions had to be distributed or received for the
purpose of sale in order to obtain a conviction. See supra note 57.
83. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
84. H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 77, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 494.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. H.R. 2106, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 2432,98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983);
H.R. 3062, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3298, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). For
a more detailed discussion of these bills, see H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 77, at 5,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 496.
88. H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 77, at 5,'reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 496.
89. See H.R. 2432, supra note 87 (proposing to raise the age of protection to eigh-
teen if there was an affirmative defense to a prosecution where the depiction in question
portrayed masturbation or lewd exhibition of the genitals and the material had serious
literary, artistic, scientific, social, or educational value, and also making these offenses
subject to RICO actions); H.R. 3062, supra note 87 (proposing an exception for the visual
depiction of "simulated" sexual conduct by minors if the material, taken as a whole, has
a serious literary, artistic, scientific, social, or political or educational value); H.R. 3298,
supra note 87 (proposing an exception for visual depiction of "simulated" sexual conduct
by minors if the possibility of harm to the child was outweighed by redeeming social,
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a compromise which would provide an affirmative defense allow-
ing "simulation[s]" of "explicit sexual conduct" only if there was
no possibility of harm to the minor. ° This provision, however,
was criticized as providing a loophole within the statute. Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Mark M. Richard expressed concern on
behalf of the Justice Department that such an affirmative defense
would create an "appealing loophole" allowing child pornographers
to frustrate the purpose of the statute by placing otherwise pro-
scribed child pornography materials within a legitimate literary or
scientific work.9'
Additionally, one of the proposals considered by the House
would have defined the word "simulated" in the statute for the first
time.92 This bill defined "simulated" as "the explicit depiction of
any ['sexually explicit conduct' as defined], which creates the ap-
pearance of such conduct and which exhibits any uncovered portion
of the genitals or buttocks. 93 Concerned that the narrow definition
of simulated conduct could prove to be a significant loophole to
imaginative pornographers, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Richard recommended that the term "simulated" should not be
defined or that the definition should not require the exhibition of
any uncovered portion of the genitals or buttocks.94 Other individ-
uals who testified before Congress, such as Senator David D.
Marriott, from the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Fami-
lies, also agreed that defining "simulated" conduct would leave
potential loopholes in the law:
Some may argue that if it is only simulation, there is no
harm to the child or children. But one of the evils of child
pornography is that children are permanently recorded as
literary, scientific, or artistic value of the material).
90. H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 77, at 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 497.
91. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 504.
92. H.R. 2432, supra note 87, quoted in H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 77, at 13,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 504. The term "simulated," used in the definition of
"sexually explicit conduct," was not defined in the 1977 Act. See supra note 59. It re-
mains undefined in the present version of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) (1988 and
Supp. IV 1992).
93. H.R. 2432, supra note 87.
94. H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 77, at 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 504.
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engaging in despicable acts. Simulation is no different in
this respect because it still creates the appearance that they
are engaged in the acts. The children will have to live
with that knowledge if these images are out there. We need
to protect them from that and also from the psychological
damage that may occur to the child....
Now, I realize that to some this is a small loophole in
the law, but I also realize that those who would stoop to
exploiting children in the production of pornography would
be very willing to take advantage of any loophole they
thought might be available to avoid prosecution.
95
Senator Grassley testified that an amendment should not define
"simulated" conduct, but should instead "preserve the current law
as it relates to simulations of sexual conduct. ' 96 He explained that
"sexually explicit conduct" is defined as "actual or simulated con-
duct that utilizes any of the prohibited depictions delineated in
section 2252(a)(2). ' 97 Senator Grassley also stated that this preser-
vation of the term "simulated" would discourage imaginative
pornographers from discovering loopholes.98
c. The Child Protection Act of 1984
Congress enacted the Child Protection Act of 198499 to remedy
the weaknesses in the 1977 Act and to account for the Ferber deci-
sion.' 0° The Child Protection Act of 1984 amended the 1977 Act
by: (1) eliminating the obscenity requirement;'0 ' (2) eliminating
the commercial purpose and sale requirements;'0 2 (3) creating a
95. 129 CONG. REc. 32,461-62 (1983) (emphasis added).
96. 130 CONG. REC. 7198 (1984).
97. id.
98. Id.
99. Pub. L. No. 98-292, §§ 2-9, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2251-2254 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
100. For further discussion of this revision, see Sharilyn E. Christiansen, The Child
Protection Act: A Blanket Prohibition Smothering Constitutionally Protected Expression,
9 LOY. ENT. L.J. 301 (1989); Weiss, supra note 33, at 342-43.
101. Pub. L. No. 98-292, § 4(3), 98 Stat. at 204 (1984). The 1984 amendment
deleted the term "obscenity" from each place it appeared in the statute. Id.
102. Id. § 4(1)-(2), 98 Stat. at 204. The 1984 amendment deleted "for the purpose
of sale or distribution for sale" where it appeared in § 2252. Id.
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new offense for knowingly reproducing any visual depiction of a
child engaging in sexually:explicit conduct for distribution through
the mails; °3 (4) raising the age of protection of children under the
statute from those under sixteen to those under eighteen;"° and (5)
replacing the word "lewd" with the word "lascivious" where "sexu-
ally explicit conduct" was defined as, inter alia, "lewd exhibition
of the genitals."'0 5  Congress replaced "lewd" with "lascivious"
because "lewd" had been associated with obscenity and Congress
wanted to make it clear that an exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area did not have to meet the obscenity standard to be unlawful."
Pursuant to the recommendations of Senator Grassley and others,0 7
no change was made to existing statutory prohibitions regarding
"simulated" sexual conduct 08 and no affirmative defense for liter-
ary, artistic, scientific, social, political, or educational value was
included. 19
3. Post-1984 Amendments
As a result of the 1984 revisions, federal prosecutions increased
dramatically. 0 Nevertheless, the House Judiciary Committee con-
tinued to examine the seriousness of the problem of child pornogra-
phy. " The Committee concluded there was a need to ban adver-
103. Id. § 4(7), 98 Stat. at 204. Congress inserted the following in § 2252 after the
term "mailed": "or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for distribution in inter-
state or foreign commerce or through the mails." Id.
104. Id. § 5(1), 98 Stat. at 205.
105. Id. § 5(4), 98 Stat. at 205.
106. 130 CONG. REC. 7196 (1984); see infra note 144 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (1988).
109. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252-2257 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
110. See Caughlan, supra note 79, at 190.
111. See H.R. REP. No. 910, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5952-59; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary on Implementation of the Child Protection Act, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
In 1984 and 1985, Senator Roth chaired hearings before the Permanent Subcommit-
tee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs ("Permanent Sub-
committee") on the topic of child pornography and pedophilia. H.R. REP. No. 910, supra,
at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5953. He then testified before the Subcommittee
on Crime that there may have been as many as one-half million children and adolescents
I[Vol. 5:167
1994] PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 187
tisements related to the sexual exploitation of children and a need
for greater enforcement of laws that. prohibit the transportation of
minors for purposes of sexual exploitation.' 2 The Committee also
concluded that the Act's reference to "visual depictions" needed to
be clarified to include undeveloped film and that the legislation
prohibiting the transportation of females for illegal sexual activity,
the Mann Act, 13 should be amended so as to be gender-neutral. 14
In 1986, Congress passed amendments relating to all of the Com-
mittee's recommendations," 15 and in 1988, Congress again amended
the statute by clarifying that transportation of child pornography by
interstate or foreign commerce means "by any means, including by
computer." 6
4. State Legislation Prohibiting the Private Possession of
Child Pornography and Osborne v. Ohio
Although Congress extensively amended the federal child por-
nography laws in 1984, it did not prohibit the private possession of
child pornography without proof that the pornography crossed state
boundaries. This is necessary to trigger invocation of federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution." 7 States, however, did not have this obstacle to the
who are the victims of sexual abuse annually. Id. He offered the Judicial Committee a
seventy-six page Draft Report of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on "Child
Pornography and Pedophilia" which demonstrated the continuation of the widespread
distribution of child pornography and which included conclusions and recommendations
of the Subcommittee. Id.
112. H.R. REP. No. 910, supra note 111, at 5-6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5955-56.
113. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-22, 2424 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
114. H.R. REP. No. 910, supra note 111, at 7-8, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5957-58.
115. Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, §§ 2-5,
100 Stat. 3510, 3510-12 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2255, 2421-
24 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
116. Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
§ 751 1(a)-(c), 102 Stat. 4181, 4485 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(c),
2252(a), 2256 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
117. The Commerce Clause provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall have power
... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states . ... "
188 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
regulation of at-home possession of obscene materials and child
pornography, and as a result, by 1990, nineteen states had criminal-
ized the possession of child pornography. 1 8 In fact, the Attorney
General's Commission on Pornography encouraged state legisla-
tures to make the knowing possession of child pornography a felo-
ny."19
Several state courts upheld the constitutionality of state statutes
criminalizing the possession of child pornography. 2 ° However,
some commentators argued that criminalizing the private possession
of child pornography violated the right to privacy and conflicted
with the Supreme Court's 1969 decision in Stanley v. Georgia,12 1
in which the Court held that the government may not regulate the
private possession of obscene materials by an individual at home. 122
Nevertheless, in 1990, the Supreme Court decided in Osborne
v. Ohio'23 that the state's interest in regulating the possession of
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, ci. 3.
118. Smith, supra note 36, at 1013. The states that had criminalized the possession
of child pornography were the following: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.
103, 111 n.6 (1990). As of January 1992, twelve other states had followed suit: Califor-
nia, Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. Smith, supra note 36, at
1114 n.106.
119. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 648.
120. See, e.g., Illinois v. Geever, 522 N.E.2d 1200 (I11. 1988), appeal dismissed, 488
U.S. 920 (1988); Ohio v. Meadows, 503 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
936 (1987).
121. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
122. See, e.g., Caughlan, supra note 79 (analyzing the tensions between Ferber and
Stanley); John Quigley, Child Pornography and the Right to Privacy, 43 FLA. L. REV. 347
(1991) (arguing against criminalizing mere possession of child pornography); Mark J.
Oberstaedt, Comment, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-States May Proscribe the
Possession of Non-Obscene Child Pornography-Osborne v. Ohio, 21 SETON HALL L.
REV. 419 (1991).
123. 495 U.S. 103 (1990). For further discussion of Osborne v. Ohio, see generally
Susan Daniel, Osborne v. Ohio: Does It Mean the End of Protection Afforded by Stan-
ley?, 69 WASH. L. Q. 981 (1991); Kari Beth Kipf, Ohio Statute Prohibiting In-Home
Possession of Child Pornography Upheld Against First Amendment Interest-Osborne v.
Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 262 (1991); JoEllen Lane, Section 2907.3-
23(A)(3) of the Ohio Code, Which Prohibits the Private Possession and Viewing of Child
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child pornography outweighed any individual, rights to privacy and
the possession of child pornography. Osborne had been convicted
under an Ohio statute for possessing four photographs of nude
minors. 24  Unlike other state child pornography statutes which
defined proscribed material as anything involving sexual conduct
or lewd depictions of minors, 25 in Osborne, the state law prohibit-
ed, with certain exceptions, the possession of depictions of minors
"in a state of nudity."'126 The Ohio Supreme Court, therefore, had
narrowly construed the statute's language to cover only "lewd"
depictions or those "involving a . . graphic focus on a minor's
genitals" 127 because of the Supreme Court's statements in New York
v. Ferber 28 and Erznoznik v. Jacksonville29 that depictions of nudi-
ty alone constitute protected speech under the First Amendment,
and therefore cannot be proscribed. 30  Thus, the Ohio Supreme
Court upheld Osborne's conviction.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court upheld the statute
because the Ohio Supreme Court construed the law to prohibit only
the possession of materials which included either a vivid focus on
Pornography, is Not Unconstitutional Given the Compelling State Interest in Protecting
the Psychological and Physical Well-Being of Minors and Preventing Their Exploitation,
68 U. DET. L. REV. 427 (1991); Christopher P. Lu, The Role of State Courts in Narrow-
ing Overbroad Speech Laws After Osborne v. Ohio, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 253 (1991);
Smith, supra note 36.
124. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 106.
125. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3553 (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-
403 (West 1990); FLA. STAT. ch. § 827.171 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100 (Michie
1988); IDAHO CODE § 18-1507A (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20.1 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3516 (Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
617.247 (West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 573.037 (Vernon Supp. 1991); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-813.01 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.730 (Michie Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1021.2 (West Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-23.1 (Supp.
1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26 (West Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-3
(1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68.070 (West Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8C-
3, 61-8D-6 (1989).
126. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
127. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 107.
128. 458 U.S. 747, 764-66 (1982) (upholding statute prohibiting non-obscene child
pornography).
129. 422 U.S. 205, 212-14 (1975) (holding that some nudity is not obscene even to
minors and that a sweeping ban on all nudity featured in drive-in movies is unconstitu-
tional).
130. Id. at 213.
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the minor's genitals or a lewd display of nudity. 3 ' The Osborne
Court based its decision on several factors. Primarily, the Court
rejected Osborne's First Amendment argument by finding that Ohio
had a compelling interest in "safeguarding the physical and psycho-
logical well-being of a minor."132 The Court emphasized that its
holding in Stanley v. Georgia,133 should be construed narrowly
because Georgia's justification for its law, "that obscenity would
poison the minds of its viewers," was found to be inadequate.1
34
On the other hand, the Court found the statute at issue in Osborne
to contain a proper purpose-to protect the victims of child por-
nography by destroying a market for the exploitative use of chil-
dren.135 The Court found further support for the Osborne decision
in Ferber, where the Court characterized the value of permitting
child pornography as "'exceedingly modest, if not de minimis."' 136
The Court also considered other factors: (1) the anti-possession
prohibitions may decrease the demand for child pornography and
thus may have a subsequent chilling effect on production; (2) the
child pornography market had become an underground network and
so it was now difficult, if not impossible, to destroy the industry by
only attacking production and distribution; (3) the materials pro-
duced by child pornographers permanently record the victim's
abuse and can haunt the child in years to come; and (4) the de-
struction of these materials is desirable because evidence suggests
that pedophiles use child pornography "to seduce other children
into sexual activity."' 137 ' The Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography reported that "[c]hild pornography is often used as
part of a method of seducing child victims. A child who is reluc-
tant to engage in sexual activity with an adult or to pose for sexu-
ally explicit photos can sometimes be convinced by viewing other
131. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 113 (1990).
132. Id. at 109 (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-58 (1982)).
133. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
134. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108, 109 (citing Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564-68).
135. Id. at 109.
136. Id. at 108 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762).
137. Id. at 110-111.
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children having 'fun' participating in the activity."' 38  Based on
these prevailing state interests, the Osborne Court concluded that
Ohio may constitutionally prohibit the possession and viewing of
child pornography. 39
5. The Current Federal Statute
In response to the Osborne decision, Congress amended the federal
child pornography laws again in 1990 by, inter alia, banning the
mere possession of child pornography.'4 The present version of
the federal child pornography laws, pertinent in Knox, prohibits an
individual from knowingly receiving or possessing three or more
books or films that have been mailed and contain visual depictions
of a child under the age of eighteen engaging in sexually explicit
conduct. 141 "Sexually explicit conduct" is defined in 18 U.S.C. §
2256(2) and includes the actual or simulated "lascivious exhibition
138. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 649 (footnotes omitted).
139. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 111 (1990).
140. Child Protection and Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4808 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and (a)(4)(B) provide in pertinent part that any person
who:
(2) knowingly receives ... any visual depiction that has been mailed ... in
interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains materials which have been
mailed... if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
(4) either-
(B) knowingly possesses 3 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films,
video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual depiction that has
been mailed... in interstate.., commerce, or which was produced using
materials which have been mailed ... if-
(i) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaged in sexually explicit conduct; and
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A)-(B), (4)(B)(i)-(ii) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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of the genitals or pubic area of any person."'142
B. "Lascivious Exhibitions": Dost and its Progeny
Although pornographic depictions of clothed children had nev-
er, before Knox, been examined by the courts, 43 several courts
have addressed the issue of determining whether a depiction quali-
fies as a "lascivious exhibition."' 44  In United States v. Dost,145
defendants Dost and Wiegand photographed two children: (1) a
nude fourteen-year-old girl, posed in a variety of positions, many
142. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) provides in pertinent part:
"For the purposes of this chapter, the term 'sexually explicit conduct' means actual or
simulated--(A) sexual intercourse ... ; (B) bestiality; (C) masturbation; (D) sadistic or
masochistic abuse; or (E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any per-
son."
18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
143. That is, the courts have never before been faced with a case in which the
children were depicted with fully covered genitals. Nevertheless, the rationale of several
recent court decisions, applied analogously to the facts in Knox, support a finding that
Knox's conduct was illegal.
144. See United States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Villard, 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal.
1986), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Weigand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 856 (1987).
The 1984 amendment that changed the definition of sexually explicit conduct to
include lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area and not mere lewd exhibition
was intended to broaden the reach of the statute. Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 831; see also
supra note 106 and accompanying text. The courts, however, have often used the terms
"lewd" and "lascivious" interchangeably. See, e.g., Weigand, 812 F.2d at 1243 (holding
that the term "'lascivious' is no different in its meaning than 'lewd,' a commonsensical
term whose constitutionality was specifically upheld in Miller and Ferber." (citations
omitted)).
Because the term lascivious is not defined in the statute, defendants have often
challenged the constitutionality of the phrase, "lascivious exhibitions of the genitals or
pubic area." See, e.g., Wolf, 890 F.2d 241; Villard, 885 F.2d 117; Weigand, 812 F,2d at
1239. The courts have consistently held that the term "lascivious exhibition" is neither
vague nor overbroad. United States v. Ferber, 485 U.S. 747, 773 (1982); Wolf, 890 F.2d
at 246; Villard, 885 F.2d 117; United States v. O'Malley, 854 F.2d 1085, 1087 (8th Cir.
1988); United States v. Reedy, "845 F.2d 239, 241 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Freeman, 808 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987); Weigand,
812 F.2d at 1239.
145. 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Weigand,
812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987).
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of which displayed her pubic area "to be the prominent focal point
of the photograph"; and (2) a nude ten-year-old girl, displaying
little, if any, signs of "sexual coyness" but photographed in an
unusual position with her legs open displaying her pubic area.1
46
The court stated that it "would not presume to create a comprehen-
sive definition of either lewdness or lasciviousness, a definition
with which legal scholars have struggled for years," but that a
"'lascivious exhibition' determination must be made on a case-by-
case basis using general principles as guides for analysis."
' 147
The Dost court also stated that what constitutes a "lascivious
exhibition" of a child's genitals is different from that of a lascivi-
ous exhibition of an adult's genitals because of the sexual inno-
cence of children. 148 The court emphasized that because a child of
tender years is innocent in sexual matters, the child is presumably
incapable of exuding sexual coyness, and thus, lascivious behavior
is outside the scope of a young child's range of experience. 49 The
Dost court outlined six factors to be considered in making an over-
all judgment of lasciviousness, taking into consideration the age of
the child: 150
(1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the
child's genitalia or pubic area;
(2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is sexually sug-
gestive, i.e., in a place or pose generally associated with sexual
activity;
(3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or in
inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child;
(4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude;
(5) whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a
willingness to engage in sexual activity;
(6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit
146. Id. at 833.
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a sexual response in the viewer.1 51
The Dost court noted that "a visual depiction need not involve all
of these factors to be a 'lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area,"' but "[t]he determination will have to be made based
on the overall content of the visual depiction, taking into account
the age of the minor." 52
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit approved the district court's list of factors established in
Dost for determining what may be deemed a lascivious exhibition,
and affirmed the conviction.153 However, the court of appeals stat-
ed that the standard applied by the district court was "over-gener-
ous" because it implied that the pictures of the older nude child
would not be lascivious "unless they showed sexual activity or the
willingness to engage in it.' ' 154 The court of appeals then explained
why the depictions of the older child were "lascivious exhibition[s]
of the genitals":
The offense defined by the statute is [a] depiction of the
lascivious exhibition of the genitals. Plainly the pictures
were an exhibition. The exhibition was of the genitals. It
was a lascivious exhibition because the photographer ar-
rayed it to suit his peculiar lust. Each of the pictures fea-
tured the child photographed as a sexual object. 55
The-court of appeals determined that "[i]n the context of the statute
applied to the conduct of children, lasciviousness is not a character-
istic of the child photographed but of the exhibition which the
photographer sets up for an audience that consists of himself or
like-minded pedophiles."'' 56 The court of appeals noted, however,
that the conduct punished by the Act "does not consist in the crav-
ings of the person posing the child or in the cravings of his audi-
151. Id.
152. Id.
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ence." 157 The crime is the offense against the child-the harms to
the child's "physiological, emotional, and mental health" that flow
from the trespass against the dignity of the child. 8
The Dost factors have been cited by the D.C. Circuit, 59 and the
First,' 6° Third,161 Fifth, 162 Ninth, 16 3 and Tenth"6 Circuits, as appro-
priate when determining whether a depiction is a "lascivious exhi-
bition." In United States v. Villard,165 the Third Circuit adopted the
Dost factors because they provided a "specific, sensible meaning"
to the term lascivious, a term whose meaning was "less than crystal
clear."'166 Citing the district court, the Villard court stated, howev-
er, that child pornography is not created when a pedophile derives
sexual gratification from an otherwise innocuous photograph. 167
In United States v. Wolf, 68 the Tenth Circuit applied the Dost
factors in a case involving.photographs of a sleeping five-year-old
girl, who was an overnight guest of the defendant. 169  The photo-
graph showed the child dressed in a nightshirt pulled up above her
waist exposing the lower half of her nude body. 70 Her legs were
157. Id. at 1245.
158. Id. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982)).
159. See American Library Ass'n v. Thornburgh, 713 F. Supp. 469, 474 (D.D.C.
1989) (citing the Dost factors as the accepted means of determining whether a depiction
is a "lascivious exhibition"), judgment vacated, 956 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
160. See United States v. Nolan, 818 F.2d 1015, 1019 (1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting
defendant's argument that the government did not prove that the children depicted were
actual children, applying the Dost factors, and affirming defendant's conviction).
161. See United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989); United States
v. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 822 (3d Cir. 1992), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993),
aff'd, 32 F.3d 733 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL 512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995).
162. See United States v. Rubio, 834 F.2d 442, 448 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding Dost
factors were appropriate to use in jury instructions to determine whether there was a
"lascivious exhibition").
163. See United States v. Arvin, 900 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1990) (following the
Dost court's holding that the child depicted need not be engaging in or showing a willing-
ness to engage in sexual activity).
164. See United States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241, 244 (10th Cir. 1989).
165. 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1989).
166. Id. at 122.
167. Id. at 125 (citing United States v. Villard, 700 F. Supp. 803, 812 (D.N.J. 1988)).
168. 890 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1989).
169. Id. at 242, 244.
170. Id. at 243.
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spread apart and one leg appeared to be propped up with bed-
ding.' 71 The court in Wolf applied the Dost factors and found that
the depictions violated the Act. 72 The court agreed with Dost that
all of the factors need not be present to find a "lascivious exhibi-
tion."' 73 However, unlike Dost, the court in Wolf stated that its
holding did not require that more than one factor be present to
constitute a violation of the Act.
74
In addition, in United States v. Mr. A., 7 5 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan applied the Dost
factors to photographs taken by Mr. and Mrs. A. of their young
children, nieces and nephews, and a neighbor's child, who were all,
for the most part, in a state of nudity and in no unnatural posi-
tions. 176 The judge, as the trier of fact, stated that, in addition to
the Dost factors, any other factors deemed appropriate may be used
by the court, and that the apparent motive of the photographer and
intended response of the viewer were relevant.17 The judge noted
that more was needed for a conviction than distastefulness in the
photos. 178 Since he could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Mr. and Mrs. A. had photographed their children "in a manner
intended ... to arouse or satisfy the sexual cravings" of a viewer
or "for the purposes of their own sexual gratification," the judge
acquitted the defendants. 79
Two state courts have also adopted the Dost factors as a gener-
al guide for determining whether a depiction involves a child en-
gaged in sexually explicit conduct. 180 Moreover, in United States
171. Id.
172. Id. at 246.
173. Id. at 245.
174. Id. at 245 n.6.
175. 756 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
176. Id. at 327-28. The court did not mention whether there was any unnatural
focus.
177. Id. at 329 (citing United States v. Arvin, 900 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1990)).
178. Id. at 329.
179. Id.
180. See Illinois v. Hebel, 527 N.E.2d 1367, 1379 (I1l. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1085 (1989) (finding Dost factors relevant and "helpful" in determining that defendant's
photographs of nude children, some of which show an adult hand touching the child's
genitals, violated the Act); Nebraska v. Saulsbury, 498 N.W.2d 338, 344 (1993) (finding
the Dost factors relevant in determining whether the depiction was proscribed by a state
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v. Freeman,181 a case decided before Dost, the Eighth Circuit ad-
dressed the issue of whether the term "lascivious exhibition of the
genitals" reasonably gave notice "that it was illegal to video tape
a sixteen year old girl, wearing nothing but a see-through orange
scarf, and to zoom in for close up shots of her genitals."1 82 The
court noted that comprehensive definitions are not required to ap-
pear in every criminal statute. 83 "[A]ll that is required is that the
language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.
.. ,,84 The court could not see "how men of reasonable intelli-
gence, guided by common understanding and practices, would be-
lieve such conduct was permissible," and thus concluded' that de-
fendants had notice that their activity was illegal.1 85
Thus, the Dost factors have been widely accepted as the method
for determining whether certain depictions of nude children are
considered "lascivious exhibitions." The cases that have utilized
the Dost factors demonstrate that courts commonly apply a reason-
able interpretation of the language of the term "lascivious exhibi-
tion" on a case-by-case basis, using general principles as guides for
analysis.
II. UNITED STATES V. KNOX
A. Procedural History
1. Factual Setting
In March 1991, the U.S. Customs Service intercepted two mail-
ings 1 86 sent from Europe to Stephen A. Knox. 87 These mailings,
statute similar to the federal statute).
181. 808 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987).
182. Id. at 1292.
183. Id.
184. Id. (citations omitted).
185. Id.
186. The postal workers followed routine procedures used to examine international
mail for the purposes of collecting taxes and duties and of preventing the introduction of
contraband into the country. United States v. Knox, 776 F. Supp. 174, 177 (M.D. Pa.
1991). Postal workers may open mail based on a reasonable suspicion that the mail may
contain something more than correspondence, Id. Cf. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S.
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addressed to an alias used by Knox, contained a catalogue advertis-
ing the sale of videotapes of nude, semi-clothed, and clothed mi-
nors as well as a returned check that Knox had sent to a company
with a request for videotapes. 188 Customs investigators, aware that
Knox had previously been convicted of receiving child pornography
through the mail, obtained a search warrant and conducted a search
of Knox's apartment for child pornography. 89 During the search
of Knox's apartment, investigators seized three videotapes that
Knox had compiled from about fifteen videotapes sold by the
Nather Company of Las Vegas, Nevada ("Nather"),' 9° as well as a
Nather advertising catalogue ("Nather catalogue"), which contained
checkmarks next to several videotape selections. 19'
Ct. 1535 (1992). In Jacobson, the United States Supreme Court found entrapment as a
matter of law where postal authorities, over a period of twenty-six months, sent Jacobson
materials from five different fictitious organizations soliciting and promoting child prosti-
tution and child pornography, to which he responded. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1537. The
Court based its conclusion on the fact that the government could, not prove he had a
predisposition to act illegally. Id. For further discussion of Jacobson and entrapment in
general, see Brian Thomas Feeney, Note, Scrutiny for the Serpent: The Court, Refines
Entrapment Law in Jacobson v. United States, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 1027 (1993); Elena
Luisa Garella, Note, Reshaping the Federal 'Entrapment Defense; Jacobson v. United
States, 68 WASH. L. REV. 185 (1993); Jack B. Harrison, Case Note, The Government As
Pornographer: Government Sting Operations and Entrapment: United States v. Jacob-
son, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1067 (1993); J. Patrick Sullivan, Note, The.Evolution of the
Federal Law of Entrapment: A Need for a New Approach, 58 Mo. L. REV. 403 (1993).
187. United States' Brief (Bryson) at 2.
188. Id. Knox had mailed the check to a company in France as a request for two
videos, Little Girl Bottoms (Underside) and Little Blondes. United States v. Knox, 977
F.2d 815, 817 (3d Cir. 1992); United States' Brief (Bryson) at 3. The company returned
the check, advising Knox to determine whether the videos he had ordered were legal in
the United States. United States' Brief (Days) at 3.
189. Knox, 977 F.2d at 815, 817.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 824. The videotapes seized were compiled by Knox from videotapes sold
by Nather which had titles such as Ripe and Tender, Young Flashers, and Sweet Young
Things. The Nather catalogue described Young and Tight, one of the films from which
Knox made his videotapes, as "featuring about 20 young beauties, ages 8-14, performing
baton twirling, majorette and gymnastics routines, plus our usual panty flashing shots and
tight young butts in short-shorts and bikinis." With respect to Lollipops, which is also
excerpted on one of Knox's tapes, the Nather catalogue stated that there is "an enchanting
scene showing dark haired beauty of 11 letting us have a long, slow look up her dress to
view her snow-white panties." United States' Brief (Days) at 3-4. In addition, Lollipops
features "scenes of a thirteen-year-old in a leopard skin bikini with a magnificent ass that
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Each of the three tapes seized ("Nather tapes") featured various
females between the ages of ten and seventeen dressed in "bikini
bathing suits, leotards, underwear or other abbreviated attire."'' 92
The children were "striking provocative poses for the camera" and
"were obviously being directed by someone off-camera." '193 In the
course of each vignette, the photographer zoomed in on the child's
pubic area, which was covered by underwear or other abbreviated
clothing, and spent "more than a substantial amount of time focus-
ing.., on these areas."194 The tapes contained numerous sequenc-
es during which all that was visible on the screen was the clothed
portion of a young girl from her navel to her thigh.95 "The girls
[were] typically wearing bathing suits or leotards, or spreading their
legs so that their panties [were] visible under a short skirt." '96
she puts on display as she walks back and forth slowly and teasingly." Id. at 4. Further-
more, according to the Nather catalogue, Early Adolescence, which Knox also reproduced
on to one of his own tapes, was made in response "to the many requests we have been
receiving for exclusively candid panty shots." Id. The catalogue advised that, "if you
like undies on girls between the ages of 8 and 16, we suggest you order this rare tape
today." Id.
The catalogue also commented:
'Sassy Sylphs' will blow your mind so completely you'll be begging for mercy.
Just look at what we have in this incredible tape: about 14 girls between the
ages of 11 and 17 showing so much panty and ass you'll get dizzy .... [Tihere
are boobs galore and T-back (thong) bathing suits on girls as young as 15 that
are so revealing it's almost like seeing them naked (some say even better).
Knox, 977 F.2d at 818. Investigators also retrieved envelopes addressed to Nather, mail
order forms from Nather, and a carbon copy of a money order payable to the Nather
Company for an amount equal to the price of a single video. Id. at 817, 824.
192. Knox, 977 F.2d at 817.
193. Id. At one point in one of the Nather tapes, one child said to someone off-
camera, "I don't know what to do." Supreme Court Brief of National Law Center for
Children and Families, et al., as Amici Curie in Support of the Respondent at 10, Knox
(No. 92-1183), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993) [hereinafter Brief of Nation-
al Law Center for Children]. Then, someone off-camera asked the child to push up her
knees. Id. The female child complied, and the camera focused directly on her panties.
Id. Another person off-camera responded, "We love it." Id.
194. United States v. Knox, 776 F. Supp. 174, 179 (M.D. Pa. 1991), aff'd, 977 F.2d
815 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2926, vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 375
(1993), aff'd, 32 F.3d 733 (1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL 512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995);
United States' Brief (Days) at 4-5.
195. United States' Brief (Days) at 5.
196. Id. The Brief of National Law Center for Children provides further detail on
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2. District Court Proceedings
Based on the three videotapes seized from his apartment, Knox
was charged with receiving and possessing child pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (4). 197 In a pretrial motion
to dismiss the indictment, Knox claimed that nudity was a prerequi-
site to a finding of a proscribed "exhibition" and that, since there
was no nudity depicted in the videotapes, the videotapes did not
contain an "exhibition" of the genitals or pubic area as proscribed
by the Act.'98 The United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania denied the motion' 99 and on November 15,
1991, convicted Knox for knowingly receiving visual depictions of
minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct through the mail and
knowingly possessing such visual depictions in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2), (4), and 2256.200 The district court reasoned
that because the "uppermost portion of the inner thigh" was in
close proximity to the genitals, it may be included in the definition
of "pubic area" under 18 U.S.C. § 2256.01
the content and nature of the Nather tapes:
[A] pre-teen female is depicted in a tree holding a squirming younger female;
both are clothed .... The camera focuses on the panties of the older child
numerous times. The younger childremarks, "My friend did a video and she
got five dollars."
Later... a bikini-clad female is hanging upside down and her bikini top
falls down exposing her nipple.... The camera quickly focuses on the exposed
nipple [and then] focuses on the female's pubic area numerous times.
Brief of National Law Center for Children at 10.
197. Knox, 776 F. Supp. 174, 175 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
198. Id. at 179-80.
199. Id. at 180. Prior to trial, Knox, by stipulation, waived his right to a jury trial
in return for the government's declining to prosecute based on hard-core videotapes seized
from Knox's apartment. Stephen A. Knox's Response in Opposition to the Government's
Motion to Remand at 2, Knox (No. 92-1183). These more sexually explicit tapes are not
discussed in the Knox case or in any of the briefs.
200. Brief of Petitioner (No. 92-1183) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
201. Knox, 776 F. Supp. at 180. Knox was sentenced to concurrent terms of five
years imprisonment for both counts. Knox, 977 F.2d at 818. Knox subsequently filed a
motion for judgment of acquittal, submitting with it an affidavit of Dr. Todd Olsen,
Director of Human Gross Anatomy at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine in New
York. The affidavit stated that a definition of the "pubic area" that includes the upper-
most portion of the inner thigh is anatomically incorrect. Id.; Knox, 776 F. Supp. at 180.
The district court, however, denied this motion, filed three months after entry of the
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3. Court of Appeals Decision
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed the conviction. 202 Although it concluded that the
district court's broad definition of pubic area was erroneous,' 3 the
court of appeals held that the statute's proscription against "lascivi-
ous exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" did not require a find-
ing of nudity.2 °4 Conforming to standards of statutory construction,
the court first considered the language of the statute itself.2 5 The
court noted that the dictionary defined the verb "exhibit" as "to
present to view: show, display ... to show publicly: put on dis-
play in order to attract notice to what is interesting or instruc-
tive,'2°6 and found that the genitals and pubic area of the young
girls in the videotapes were "'on display' as the camera focused for
prolonged time intervals on close-up views" of these areas. 207 The
court further stated that the "obvious purpose and inevitable effect
of the videotape was to 'attract notice' specifically to the genitalia
and pubic area.' '208 Applying the plain meaning of the word "exhi-
bition," the court held that there was no nudity requirement in the
statute and that Knox's actions constituted a violation of the stat-
ute.20
9
The court of appeals also found that the legislative history of
the Act supported its interpretation. 210 Although the language of
one of the four bills introduced in 1977 criminalized depictions of
"nudity, 211 Congress ultimately failed to adopt such language in
verdict, as untimely. Knox, 977 F.2d at 818.
202. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 825-26 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2926,
vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993), aff'd, 32 F.3d 733 (3d Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 1994 WL 512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995).
203. Id. at 819.
204. Id. at 820.
205. Id.





210. Id. at 820-21.
211. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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the 1977 Act.212 Thus, since the proscription against "lewd exhibi-
tion of the genitals or pubic area of any person" did not contain
any language limiting its scope to nude displays, the court of ap-
peals concluded that Congress intended "to criminalize both clothed
and unclothed visual images of a child's genitalia if they were
lewd. 213
The court of appeals also examined the underlying rationale
behind the federal child pornography laws,214 the Supreme Court's
decision in New York v. Ferber,2 15 and the compelling governmen-
tal interest in protecting the "physical and psychological well-be-
ing" of children.216 The court noted that "the psychological effect
of visually recording the sexual exploitation of a child is devastat-
ing" and that the elimination of the child pornography industry was
of "surpassing importance., 21 7 Thus, the court found its interpreta-
tion of the statute consistent with the purpose of the Act and con-
cluded that "[t]he rationale underlying the statute's proscription
applies equally to any lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area whether these areas are clad or completely exposed.,
21 8
Finally, the court of appeals held that its interpretation of an
"exhibition" of the genitals or pubic area "[did] not render the
statute unconstitutionally overbroad" because "[o]nly a minuscule
fraction of all pictures of minor children will be sufficiently sexual-
ly suggestive and unnaturally focused on the genitalia to qualify as
lascivious. "219 The court emphasized that the limiting principle in
the statute is the requirement of lasciviousness, 2 ° and further stated
that whether a depiction is lascivious or not is a "subjective inquiry
212. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
213. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 820 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2926, vacated
and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993), aff'd, 32 F.3d 733 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
1994 WL 512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995).
214. Id. at 821-23 (noting that the Act's purpose is to protect children from the
harmful effects of being used by pornographers as subjects in sexually exploitative depic-
tions).
215. 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982).
216. Id. at 756-57; see supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
217. Knox, 977 F.2d at 821 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757).
218. Id. at 822.
219. Id. at 823.
220. Id.
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into whether or not the material is intended to elicit a sexual re-
sponse from the viewer. 221
B. Briefs Submitted to the United States Supreme Court
Stephen Knox appealed his conviction to the United States
Supreme Court. Prior to Knox's arrest in 1991, no one had been
prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2), (4) and 2256(2)(E) for
materials which portrayed clothed children. The Solicitor General's
office had urged the Court not to take the Knox case,222 but the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether, inter alia, the
statute includes a nudity requirement and whether such an interpre-
tation renders the statute unconstitutionally overbroad.223
221. Id. (citing United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989)). This
standard was challenged by the Justice Department. See infra notes 262-265 and ac-
companying text.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals rejected Knox's contention that there was in-
sufficient evidence to show (1) that the tapes had travelled through the mail and (2) that
he had the requisite mental state to violate the statute because he claimed that he believed
Nather's assertions that the tapes were "completely legal." Knox, 977 F.2d at 824-25.
Noting that the mere awareness of the general nature and character of the material was
sufficient to fulfill the knowledge requirement of § 2252, the court concluded that there
was no doubt that Knox knew the nature of the materials Nather sold. Id. at 825; see
also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974) (holding that defendant need only
know of the general nature of the materials, not that they are illegal); United States v.
Moncini, 882. F.2d 401, 405 (9th Cir. 1989) (even assuming defendant was ignorant of
the child pornography laws, "he must bear the risk of the potential illegality of his con-
duct"). Knox's handwritten descriptive notations on the outside of the boxes containing
each of the Nather tapes further supported the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Knox
was fully aware of the nature of the videotapes. Knox, 977 F.2d at 825. For example,
on one tape box, Knox wrote "13-year-old flashes" followed by "hot." Id. Knox charac-
terized the second vignette as "15 year-old shows nipple." Id. The court of appeals
concluded that these descriptions along with the Nather catalogue "clearly demonstrate
that Knox was aware that the videotapes contained sexually oriented materials designed
to sexually arouse a pedophile." Id.
For further discussion on the issue of scienter, see infra note 259.
222. Linda Greenhouse, U.S. Shifts Stance in Court of Appeals: Clinton Team at
Justice Dept. Rejects Bush Positions on Rights and Smut Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
1993, at A22.
223. United States v Knox, 113 S. Ct. 2926, vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 375
(1993), aff'd, 32 F.3d 733 (1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL 512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995).
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine:
(1) [Whether] there can be an "exhibition of genitals or pubic area" under Section
2256(2)(E) under circumstances in which genitals and pubic area are fully covered
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Briefs were submitted to the Supreme Court by Knox and by
the Justice Department. The Justice Department filed one brief
which argued to affirm the conviction.224 It later filed a second
brief, advocating a new standard to be applied in Knox and request-
ing remand of the case.225 Several organizations also filed briefs
and motions for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curi-
ae.
226
1. Stephen Knox's Arguments
In his Supreme Court brief, Knox contended that the videotapes
did not depict "sexually explicit conduct" as defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(2) because there could be no exhibition of the genitals
without nudity.227 He also argued that if nudity is not required
under the statute, then the statute should be rendered unconstitu-
tionally vague and overbroad.228 Finally, Knox argued that the rule
of lenity229 required the reversal of his conviction because the Third
by an article of clothing ....
(4) Assuming that there can be "exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" under
Section 2256(2)(E) when genitals and pubic area are fully covered by clothing,
is [the] statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad?
62 U.S.L.W. 3, 46 (U.S. July 20, 1993).
224. See infra part II.B.2.
225. See infra part II.B.3.
226. Several groups organized two amici briefs which argued to uphold Knox's
conviction: (1) Brief of National Law Center for Children and Families et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of the Respondent, Knox (No. 92-1183); and (2) Brief of Amicus
Curiae National Family Legal Foundation in Support of the United States, Knox (No. 92-
1183). The Brief of National Law Center for Children provided specific details about the
Nather tapes that were not discussed at length in either the Supreme Court briefs or in the
Third Circuit's decision in Knox. See supra notes 193-196 and accompanying text.
Several other groups organized a brief which argued that Knox's conviction should
be reversed: Brief of American Booksellers Foundation For Free Expression, Council For
Periodical Distributors Associations, National Association of Artists' Organizations,
Periodical and Book Association of America, Inc., Aperture Foundation, Inc., Freedom
to Read Foundation, Magazine Publishers of America, American Civil Liberties Union
and Law & Humanities Institute, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Knox (No. 92-
1183).
227. Petitioner's Brief at 15.
228. Id. at 35-36.
229. For an explanation of the Rule of Lenity, see infra notes 343, 361-362 and
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Circuit's expansive interpretation of the child pornography statute
could not have been reasonably foreseen.23 °
Knox first argued that "exhibit" means "to offer or expose to
view." He stated that "to expose" means "to uncover" or "to bare
to the air, cold, etc. ' 231' He claimed that under these definitions, it
was clear that the plain meaning of the statute proscribes only nude
depictions of children. 232 He also argued that the garments worn
by the children in the videotapes, including skirts, school uniforms,
leotards, and bathing suits, are generally socially acceptable and
age-appropriate.233
Knox further contended that the legislative history of the Act
indicates that the statute contains a nudity requirement by pointing
to a June 14, 1977 letter drafted by then Assistant Attorney General
Wald 234 and testimony given during the 1977 Hearings by Con-
gressman Koch 235 and Professor Bender. 236 Essentially, Knox con-
tended that since the legislative history indicated a concern by
some lawyers to limit the types of nude portrayals only to those
that are lascivious, and not the type to be found in a grandparent's
photo album, the statute is limited to proscribing lascivious depic-
tions of nude minors and, therefore, his videotapes did not consti-
accompanying text.
230. Petitioner's Brief at 28-29. Knox also claimed that a reasonable mistake as to
legality of the materials is a defense. Id. at 34-35. Knox claimed that he relied on the
Nather catalogues, which not only stated that the videotapes were not child pornography,
but also explained in a believable fashion why they were not. Id. The Nather catalogue
claimed that because there was no sex or nudity, the tapes were completely legal. See
Knox, 776 F. Supp. 174, 179 (M.D. Pa. 1991), 977 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 2926, vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993), aff'd, 32 F.3d 733 (3d
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL 512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995).
231. Petitioner's Brief at 16 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (1979)).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 15, 17 n.l1.
234. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Knox also argued that Professor
Bender testified before Congress that he believed the Mathias-Culver Bill was preferable
to the Roth Bill because nudity, in general, seemed overbroad in terms of the purpose of
the statute and that nudity should be qualified as in the Mathias-Culver Bill. Petitioner's
Brief at 19-20.
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tute illegal material.237
Knox's brief discussed other portions of hearing testimony
which he claimed supported his argument that the statute includes
a nudity requirement.238  For example, Knox discussed testimony
heard in 1982, when Congress was considering amending the child
pornography statute in light of the decision in New York v. Ferber,239-
to remove the requirement that depictions be obscene in order to
be proscribed.240 Senator Specter proposed that such depictions
continue to be protected if they possess literary, artistic or scientific
merit. 241 Knox also pointed to the suggestion made by Bruce Rich,
on behalf of the Association of American Publishers, that the ex-
emption for literary, artistic, or scientific merit should apply, to the
entire range of "sexually explicit conduct," and "not merely to
'lewd exhibitions of the genitals."' 242  Knox argued that Rich's
testimony assumed that the phrase described a type of nudity:
[Ilt is not enough to merely tag on the literary, etc., excep-
tion to exhibitions of nudity, as Senator Specter's own pro-
posal would suggest.. .. We would suggest having the
literary, artistic, etc. exemption to modify the entire range
of conduct which would be otherwise prohibited.243
Therefore, according to Knox, this statement indicates an under-
standing that "exhibitions" require a state of nudity.2" In addition,
237. See Petitioner's Brief at 18-21.
238. Id. at 20-21.
239. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
240. Petitioner's Brief at 21.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 22.
243. Id. (quoting Child Pornography: Hearing on J-97-152 Before the Subcomm.
on Juvenile Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1982)).
244. Id. at 22. Knox also pointed to comments made by Robert Pitler, Bureau Chief,
Appeals Bureau, District Attorney's Office for New York County, who argued the Ferber
case before the United States Supreme Court and afterwards on remand to the New York
Court of Appeals. Id. During the Congressional hearings, Pitler criticized the arguments
of amici publishers in the Ferber case and commented that "'lewd exhibition of the
genitals' means more than mere nudity and describes a patently offensive, lascivious,
lustful or obscene display .... [A]mici publishers, for the most part, based their conclu-
sion on a misunderstanding of the term 'lewd exhibition of the genitals,' which, as noted,
does not include mere nudity." Id. at 22-23.
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Knox contended that if 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E) could be interpreted
to include depictions of children whose genitals and pubic area are
fully covered by clothing, then the statute is unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad.245 Finally, Knox argued that since Congress
used the term "lascivious exhibition of the genitals" in the context
of the phrase "sexually explicit conduct," Congress did not intend
for the statute to be all-encompassing.246 He explained that because
sexually explicit conduct is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256 to also
include sexual intercourse, bestiality, masturbation, and sadistic and
masochistic abuse, the types of materials covered under the statute
were of a specific, well-defined nature, and thus, could not also
include materials depicting clothed children performing no sexual
acts.
247
2. Justice Department's First Supreme Court Brief
The Justice Department's first Supreme Court brief, filed in
March 1993 by Acting Solicitor General William C. Bryson ("Bry-
son Brief'), relied on the Third Circuit's reasoning that an "exhibi-
tion" of the genitals or pubic area does not require nudity of the
area.248 The Bryson Brief stated that the court of appeals correctly
found that "exhibition" means to "put on display" and that "[t]he
genitals and pubic area of the young girls in the Nather tapes were
certainly 'on display' as the camera focused for prolonged time
intervals on close-up views of these body parts." 249 In addition, the
Bryson Brief argued that "[j]ust as a foot or hand could be 'exhib-
245. Id. at 35-36. Knox explained why he believed such an interpretation would
render the statute overbroad:
If an "exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" can be satisfied by depictions of
minors whose genitals are completely covered by an article of clothing, the
chilling effect of the federal statute will be enormous. Anyone who has photo-
graphed a minor at a dance recital, swim or gymnastics meet, at the beach, or
at home, will immediately understand the danger of photographing a minor in
a pose which could ultimately be deemed to be lascivious under the law.
Id. at 36.
246. Id. at 39.
247. Id. at 39-40.
248. United States' Brief (Bryson) at 7.
249. Id. at 6-7.
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ited' while covered with a sock or a glove, so here the genitals and
pubic area were 'put on display in order to attract notice' to those
areas." 250 The Bryson Brief relied on the Third Circuit's conclu-
sion that the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E) provides
no indication of a nudity requirement.2 1' The Bryson Brief stated
that, "[a]s the court of appeals pointed out . . . the fact that Con-
gress dropped any mention of the word 'nudity' in the law as en-
acted indicates that Congress 'repudiated its earlier intention to
confine the statute's coverage to nude exhibitions.' ' 252
The Bryson Brief also argued that subsequent legislative history
supports the court of appeals' interpretation that the term "exhibi-
tion" does not require the areas exhibited to be nude.253 It ex-
plained that an early proposal for the 1984 amendments, narrowly
defining the word "simulated" in the statute, was criticized by
several lawyers and congressmen. 5  They suggested that the term
"simulated" should 'be left undefined within the Act because it
would provide an appealing loophole for imaginative photogra-
phers. 6 The Bryson Brief argued that since the language defining
simulated was not included in the amendments that were enacted,
Congress intended no nudity requirement in the statute. 257
The Bryson Brief contended that the court of appeals' interpre-
tation of 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E) was not vague or overbroad.258
The Bryson Brief pointed to the court's reasoning that "[o]nly a
minuscule fraction of all pictures of minor children will be suffi-
ciently sexually suggestive and unnaturally focused on the genitalia
to qualify as lascivious. 259
250. id. at 7.
251. Id.
252. Id. (quoting United States v. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 821 (3d Cir. 1992)).
253. United States' Brief (Bryson) at 7-8.
254. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
255. United States' Brief (Bryson) at 8.
256. Id. (quoting statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Richard, Criminal
Division). See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
257. United States' Brief (Bryson) at 8.
258. Id. at 8-9.
259. id. (quoting United States v. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 823 (3d Cir. 1992)). The
Bryson Brief also argued that the court of appeals correctly held that Knox had the
requisite mental state to violate the statute. Id. at 9-10 (quotations omitted). The Bryson
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3. Justice Department's Second Brief
On September 15, 1993, the newly-appointed Solicitor Drew S.
Days, I1, submitted a second Supreme Court brief ("Days Brief')
outlining a different standard for determining what constitutes a
"lascivious exhibition." 26° The Days Brief asked the Court to va-
cate Knox's conviction and to remand Knox to the Third Circuit for
reconsideration under this proposed standard.261
The Days Brief stated that, while nudity is not an absolute
requirement for coverage under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2256, "the
court of appeals nevertheless utilized an impermissibly broad stan-
dard for determining whether a videotape [could] be considered to
be a lascivious 'exhibition' of the genitals or pubic area of a
child, ' 262 and that "neither the statutory language nor the legislative
history [would] bear such an interpretation. '"263 The Days Brief
argued that a "[lascivious] exhibition requires both that the depic-
tion [at issue] focus on those body parts and that it render them
Brief stated that, "[i]n light of the explicit descriptions of the materials [Knox] ordered
and the finding of the courts below that he was aware of the nature of the materials, 'he
must bear the risk of the potential illegality of his conduct."' Id. at 10. (quoting United
States v. Moncini, 882 F.2d 401,405 (9th Cir. 1989)). The Bryson Brief pointed out that
the Supreme Court said in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974), in the
context of an obscenity statute, that it was sufficient to show that the defendant had
knowledge of the nature and contents of the materials, and that he need not be shown to
have known that they were illegal. United States' Brief (Bryson) at 10.
The Bryson Brief correctly noted that the Ninth Circuit recently held 18 U.S.C. §
2252 unconstitutional on its face because of that court's finding that the statute contains
no requirement that the defendant have knowledge that the persons depicted in the materi-
als are children. United States' Brief (Bryson) at 10-11 (citing United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 1992)). However, every other
circuit that has considered this issue has held to the contrary. United States' Brief
(Bryson) at 11 (citing Rodriguez v. Clark Color Lab., 921 F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir. 1990);
United States v. Petrov, 747 F.2d 824, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1025
(1985)). The United States Supreme Court recently reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision
and the majority of the justices held that the term "knowingly" used in the Act extends
a scienter requirement to both the sexually explicit nature of the material and to the age
of the performers. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 1994 WL 662620 at *7-*8
(U.S. Nov. 29, 1994). The age of the performers is not at issue in Knox and, therefore,
further discussion of X-Citement Video falls outside the scope of this Comment.
260. United States' Brief (Days) at 8-9.
261. Id. at 20.
262. Id. at 8.
263. Id.
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visible in some fashion,"264 and also that the child be posing or
acting lasciviously. 265 The Days Brief contended that visibility did
not require full visual exposure, but "it require[d] at least that the
body parts themselves be discernible either through or beneath the
clothing so that it can fairly be said that the depiction is an 'exhibi-
tion' of the body parts rather than a depiction of clothed areas of
the body., 2
66
The Days Brief pointed to legislative history for support of the
proposed standard. Ironically, it discussed the same Congressional
hearings that Knox used to support his argument that nudity is
required, and that the Justice Department used in its first Supreme
Court brief to support the court of appeals' "expansive" interpreta-
tion.267 The Days Brief argued that the phrase "lewd exhibition of
the genitals or pubic area" was substituted by Congress, on the
suggestion of the Justice Department, in place of the phrase "nudi-
ty, which nudity is to be depicted for the purpose of sexual stimu-
lation or gratification . . .268 in order to delineate more clearly
"what types of nude portrayals of children were intended to be
encompassed within this definition."269
According to the Days Brief, the visibility of the body neces-
sary for a prohibited exhibition could be found if a child is depict-
ed dressed in garments which are "transparent or nearly transpar-
ent," or "so thin and tight as to reveal completely the contours of
the genitals., 270  "[T]he Justice Department's reference to 'nude
portrayals' during the drafting of this statute," the Days Brief stat-
ed, "does not preclude interpreting it in this limited fashion, al-
though it rules out the court of appeals' more expansive construc-
264. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
265. Id. at 13.
266. Id. at 10.
267. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 40, and accompanying text.
268. United States' Brief (Days) at 10-11 (citing S. 1011, supra note 41). This
language differs slightly from the actual language used in the bill, which read "nudity, if
such nudity .... See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
269. United States' Brief (Days) at 11 (quoting 1977 Hearings, supra note 40, at 77-
78) (emphasis in Days Brief).
270. Id. at 12.
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'271
In addition to the requirement of visibility of the genitals or
pubic area, the Days Brief argued that because 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(2) proscribes depictions involving "the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct" and § 2256(2), in turn, de-
fines the 'sexually explicit conduct' of minors as including "lascivi-
ous exhibition[s] of the genitals or pubic area," the statute applies
to depictions "only if they show minors engaged in the conduct of
lasciviously exhibiting their (or someone else's) genitals or pubic
areas. 272 Although concluding that the court of appeals applied an
incorrect standard, the Days Brief argued that the materials found
in Knox's possession still may have fallen within the purview of
the statute under its proposed standard.273 Thus, the Days Brief
recommended that the Court remand the case for reconsideration
under the new statutory standard it advocated.274
The Days Brief also argued that its interpretation of the Act did
not render the statute unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 275 It
stated that since there was no showing that these "arguably imper-
missible applications of the statute amount to, at most, no more
than 'a tiny fraction of the materials within the statute's reach,"'
the statute did not suffer from substantial overbreadth.276 The Days
271. Id.
272. Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added); cf. United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832
(S.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Weigand, 812 F.2d. 1239 (9th Cir. 1987)
(finding that a violation of the Act was not dependent on the child's sexual coyness).
273. United States' Brief (Days) at 13. Cf. 139 CoNG. REC. S14,977 (daily ed. Nov.
4, 1993). Some Justice Department officials made off-the-record remarks to the New York
Times which indicated that, under the Days Briefs newly suggested standard, Knox would
be acquitted:
The order that the Court issued today instructed the Third Circuit, which sits in
Philadelphia, to reconsider the case in light of the Government's current posi-
tion. Before the appeals court does that, however, Federal prosecutors are likely
to drop the prosecution. Government lawyers who have seen the tapes at issue
have said privately that they fall well below the standard for prosecution de-
scribed in the Government's new definition.
139 CONG. REC. S14,977 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993).
274. United States' Brief (Days) at 13.
275. Id. at 14-17.
276. Id. at 16 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982)). The Days
Brief also argued that, under its new interpretation, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2256 cannot
212 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
Brief also stated that the Supreme Court had already held in Miller
v. California277 and New York v. Ferber278 that a "requirement of
lewdness or lasciviousness [in the statute] does not introduce an
element of unconstitutional vagueness. '279 The Supreme Court
vacated Knox's conviction and remanded the case for further con-
sideration in light of the Justice Department's new position. °
C. Reaction to the Justice Department's Reversal and the Clin-
ton Administration's Proposal
In response to the Justice Department's reversal of its position
in the Knox case, anti-pornography groups and conservative groups
rushed to Capitol Hill and sent mass mailings to Congressional
constituents rebuking the new standard28' and accusing President
Clinton of being soft on child pornography.282 On November 4,
1993, the Senate unanimously passed a non-binding resolution
("Grassley-Roth Amendment") that child pornography laws should
be applied more broadly.283 In this resolution, Senator Grassley
emphasized that the intended purpose of the federal child pornogra-
phy laws was to outlaw sexually exploitative materials regardless
of the nudity of the child and regardless of whether the child in-
tended to act lasciviously.284 Senator Roth denounced the Justice
be found unconstitutionally vague because "[ilt will not ... be difficult to determine
whether pictures 'exhibit' the genitals or pubic areas if that term is restricted to visible
depictions of those areas." Id. at 17.
277. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
278. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
279. United States' Brief (Days) at 17. The Justice Department's second brief is in
accord with its first brief in stating that the court of appeals correctly found that the
evidence was sufficient to show that Knox had the requisite criminal intent. id. at 17-20.
Compare United States' Brief (Bryson) at 8-9 with United States' Brief (Days) at 17-20;
see also supra text accompanying note 259.
280. Knox v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993), affd on remand, 32 F.3d 735 (3d
Cir. 1994). The motions of National Law Center for Children and Families, et. al., and
National Family Legal Foundation were dismissed by the Supreme Court as moot. Id.
281. Julie Cohen, Child Porn Law A Political Mess For Clinton, Reno, THE RECORD-
ER, Nov. 22, 1993, at 1.
282. See Lewis, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
283. 139 CONG. REC. S14,976-78 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993).
284. Id. at S14,976.
[Vol. 5:167
1994] PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 213
Department's new brief, stating:
It is a travesty in that it completely misrepresents congres-
sional intent in passing the Child Protection Act of 1984.
It is a tragedy because it creates a huge new loophole in
our child pornography laws which will likely lead to a
flood of child pornography and sexual abuse of children.
211
In response to the Grassley-Roth Amendment, President Clinton
sent a public letter, dated November 10, 1993, to Attorney General
Reno, stating that he agreed with the Senate and ordering her to
submit new legislation to clarify the law.286 Reno quickly sent an
amendment to the Senate for approval which would have permitted
prosecution regardless of whether the child is clothed or un-
clothed.287 The proposed amendment provided:
An exhibition may be deemed lascivious if the depiction of
the minor is designed for the purpose of eliciting or at-
tempting to elicit a sexual response in the intended viewer;
there shall be no requirement that the minor whose image
is displayed in the material intend or understand that the
depiction is designed for such a purpose.
288
No member of Congress sponsored or proposed the amend-
ment.289 Members of the Senate, who believed the Reno bill was
unnecessary, kept the Senate from incorporating the amendment
into an omnibus crime bill, although Reno had urged it.29° Mem-
bers of the Senate stated that the existing law was sufficient and
the problem was the Justice Department's departure from the wide-
ranging interpretation of the law used under the Reagan and Bush
Administrations.291 Members of Congress were also concerned that
child pornographers currently under prosecution or investigation
would press for acquittals in their cases if the Justice Department
285. Id. at S14,977.





291. 139 CONG. REC. S15,837 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993); see Cohen, supra note 281;
Timothy M. Phelps, Child Porn: A Federal Case; Liberal View by Reno's Office Puts
Clinton Administration on Defensive, NEWSDAY, Nov. 21, 1993, at 21.
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refused to revoke its new interpretation of the Act.292
On the other hand, the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") supported the Days Brief, and Robert Peck, counsel to
the ACLU, said that the new legislative proposal was nothing more
than political posturing.293 This group and other First Amendment
advocates said that the Clinton Administration's proposal would
enforce an overly broad definition of child pornography.294 On
April 20, 1994, the House of Representatives passed, by a vote of
425-3, a nonbinding resolution that "the Department of Justice has
used its brief in the Knox case as a vehicle for reinterpretation of
the child pornography laws in contravention to legislative history,"
and that "Congress specifically repudiated a nudity requirement for
child pornography statutes. 295 The Third Circuit heard oral argu-
ment in Knox on April 28, 1994 and rendered its decision reaffirm-
ing Knox's conviction on June 9th, 1994.296
292. 139 CONG. REC. S15,837 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993). Patrick Trueman, who
headed the Justice Department's National Enforcement Unit during the Reagan and Bush
administrations, and is now the chief lobbyist for the American Family Association,
suggested that Deputy Solicitor General Paul Bender, a long-time crusader against pornog-
raphy laws, had been the architect of the Justice Department's second brief in Knox.
Cohen, supra note 281. Paul Bender gave testimony during the 1977 Congressional
hearings that was relied upon by Knox to support his argument that nudity is required,
as well as by the Days Brief to support the Justice Department's new position that visibil-
ity of the genitals was required. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Bender
admitted to having assisted in the drafting of the brief,, but he denied playing a primary
role in it. Cohen, supra note 281.
293. Cohen, supra note 281.
294. Id. The ACLU's position on regulating child pornography is as follows: "The
sexually abusive acts committed against children should be criminalized, but once those
acts are in the form of visual depictions, they are protected forms of expression." Por-
nography and the First Amendment (ACLU/Arts Censorship Project, New York, N.Y.),
1994.
295. 140 CONG. REC. H.2536 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994).
296. 32 F.3d 733 (3d Cir. 1994). Several additional motions were filed in the Third
Circuit. The following text briefly explains the key motions but does not include every
motion that was filed. The Justice Department made a motion to remand Knox to the
district court for a retrial conducted according to the Days Briefs new standard. Govern-
ment's Motion to Remand, Knox (No. 92-7089). That motion was denied by the Third
Circuit. On January 5, 1994, the Third Circuit granted a motion on behalf of 104 amici
Congressmen who wished to file a brief as amici curiae. Motion of Amici Members of
Congress in Opposition to the Government's Motion to Remand at n.1, Knox (No. 92-
7089).
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D. The Third Circuit's Decision on Remand297
On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reaffirmed Knox's conviction.298 The court of appeals con-
cluded that the plain meaning of the term "exhibition" used in the
Act does not require nudity.299 The court addressed the govern-
ment's argument that the term "exhibition," as used in the statute,
contemplates that the genitals or pubic area of the child depicted
must be visible or discernible.3°° Although the court agreed with
Knox and the government that a piece of artwork may lose its
meaning and value if it were completely covered,3° ' the court re-
jected Knox's and the government's analogous argument that by
scantily and barely covering the genitals of young girls, the dis-
plays of the girls in seductive poses destroys the value of the poses
to the viewer of child pornography. 30 2 The court stated that, "[a]lt-
hough the genitals are covered, the display and focus on the young
girls' genitals or pubic area apparently still provides considerable
interest and excitement for the pedophile observer, or else there
In the Government's Motion to Remand, the Justice Department, to some extent,
again shifted its position regarding the second part of its suggested standard-that the
child be posing or acting lasciviously. Id. at 5. The Justice Department argued:
This requirement ... does not imply that the child must have any lascivious
intent, but only that the statute is limited to depictions in which a minor is
actually engaging in some "sexually explicit conduct"; in the case of a lascivi-
ous exhibition of the genitals or pubic area, this means that the conduct the
minor was engaged in can be judged to constitute a "lascivious exhibition," i.e.,
the conduct appeals to the lascivious interest of some potential audience.
Id.
Thus, the Justice Department seemed to retreat from its earlier position. The shifting
of standards by the Justice Department raises some suspicion as to the Clinton administra-
tion's policies regarding child pornography. It also emphasizes the problems associated
with rigidly defining child pornography.
297. The Third Circuit first denied the Government's Motion to Remand. The court
stated that an immediate remand to the district court for purposes of conducting a retrial
without first deciding the legal issue presented would violate the Supreme Court's order.
United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 743 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL 512613
(U.S. Jan. 17, 1995).
298. Id. at 737.
299. Id. at 744.
300. Id. at 744-45.
301. Id. at 745.
302. Id.
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would not be a market for [such] tapes .... 303
The court noted that, since its task was to decipher Congress'
intent regarding the statutory phrase "lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area" as used in the Child Protection Act, it was
more meaningful to focus on the meaning of the statutory term
"lascivious exhibition," rather than simply on the term "exhibi-
tion.,,3°4 The court found that the term "lascivious" is defined as
"[t]ending to excite lust; lewd; indecent; obscene; sexual impurity;
tending to deprave the morals in respect to sexual relations; licen-
tious. ' 30 5 The court stated that the term "lascivious exhibition"
refers to a "depiction which displays or brings forth to view in
order to attract notice to the genitals or pubic area of children, in
order to excite lustfulness or sexual stimulation in the viewer. ' 306
Thus, the court Concluded that this definition does not contain a
nudity requirement and is consistent with the multi-factor Dost
test.30 7 The court further concluded that such a definition does not
contain or suggest a requirement that the contours of the genitals
or pubic area be discernible or otherwise visible through the child
subject's clothing.308
The court next addressed the part of the Act which indicates
that the proscribed materials must depict "the use of a child engag-
ing in sexually explicit conduct" to consider whether it must be
shown that the child displayed some lascivious intent, as argued in
the Justice Department's second Supreme Court brief.309 Noting
that the government had receded somewhat from the view set forth
in its second brief,310 the court of appeals rejected "any contention,
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 882 (6th ed. 1990)).
306. Id.
307. United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 745-46 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1994
WL 512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995). For an explanation of the Dost factors, see supra notes
150-152 and accompanying text.
308. 32 F.3d at 746. The court indicated in a footnote that, even if it were to agree
with the government that the correct statutory standard requires the genitals or pubic area
of the child depicted to be discernible through his or her clothing, it would have no
trouble in upholding Knox's conviction. Id. at 746 n. 11.
309. Id. at 746.
310. Id. For a discussion of the government's concession on this point, see supra
note 296.
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whether implied by the government or not, that the child subject
must be shown to have engaged in sexually explicit conduct with
a lascivious intent., 31' The court relied on the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in United States v. Weigand,312 where that court stated:
In the context of the statute applied to the conduct of chil-
dren, lasciviousness is not a characteristic of the child pho-
tographed but of the exhibition which the photographer sets
up for an audience that consists of himself or like-minded
pedophiles.... The picture of a child "engaged in sexually
explicit conduct" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251
and 2252 as defined by [§ 2256(2)(e)] is a picture of a
child's sex organs displayed lasciviously-that is, so pre-
sented by the photographer as to arouse or satisfy the sexu-
al cravings of a voyeur.31
3
Thus, the court found that "lasciviousness" is an inquiry that the
factfinder must make "using the Dost factors and any other relevant
factors given the particularities of the case, which does not involve
an inquiry concerning the intent of the child subject. 314
The court stated that its interpretation of "lascivious" was con-
sistent with the plain meaning of the statute and furthered Con-
gress' intent to eradicate the pervasive harm in exploiting children
in such depictions. 3 5 Thus, the court concluded that a "lascivious
exhibition" under the Act requires "only that the material depict
some 'sexually explicit conduct' by the minor subject which ap-
peals to the lascivious interest of the intended audience. 31 6
Applying this standard, the court found that the tapes in evi-
dence violated the Act since, in some sequences, they showed the
young girls, dressed in very tight leotards, bathing suits, or panties,
311. 32 F.3d at 747.
312. 812 F.2d 1239, 1244-45 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987).
313. United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 747 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL
512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995) (quoting Weigand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir.), affg
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spreading their legs to allow full view of their pubic area, or "danc-
ing or gyrating in a fashion indicative of adult sexual relations."317
The court stated that the totality of the factors demonstrated that
the minor subjects "were engaged in conduct-namely, the exhibi-
tion of their genitals or pubic area-which would appeal to the
lascivious interest of an audience of pedophiles."3 '
The court then addressed an aspect of its prior decision in
Knox. The court stated that, although it had previously concluded
that the legislative history supported its interpretation of the statuto-
ry language, upon reconsideration, it now concluded that the legis-
lative history is "wholly silent as to whether Congress intended the
statutory term 'lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area'
to encompass non-nude depictions of these body parts." 319  The
court of appeals explained that the controversial Wald letter,32°
relied upon in the court of appeals' prior opinion to support the
conclusion that Congress intended non-nude depictions to be en-
compassed within the Act, and also relied upon by Knox to refute
this conclusion, was open to two plausible interpretations. 321  Due
to these two competing interpretations, the court of appeals stated
that the legislative history is not helpful in determining Congress'
intent.322 The court, however, concluded that Knox did not meet
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 747-48.
320. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
321. Knox 32 F.3d at 748. Under the first interpretation, Congress' elimination of
the word "nudity" from the original statute proposal was deliberate and intended to
repudiate the earlier intention to restrict the statute's coverage to only nude exhibitions.
Id. On the other hand, the court found that it was "arguably significant that the language
suggesting that Congress clarify what types of nude portrayals would be prohibited was
contained in the very letter recommending the substitution of the phrase 'lewd exhibition
of the genitals' for the original nudity language." Id.
322. Id. The court of appeals noted in a footnote that it also did not rely on recent
legislative pronouncements regarding the statute and the case. Id. at 749 n. 14 (citing 139
CONG. REC. S14,976 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993)); 140 CONG. REC. H.2536 (daily ed. Apr.
20, 1994). For a discussion of these resolutions, see supra notes 283-285, 295 and ac-
companying text. The court stated that since the language of the Act was enacted in 1977
and amended in 1984, "these resolutions are post-enactment legislation which should be
given little weight, if any .... Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 749 n.14, cert. denied, 1994 WL
512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995).
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his burden of proving that Congress intended the statute to reach
only a nude "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area"
and refused to read a nudity requirement into a statute that has
none.
323
The court of appeals also found that the underlying rationale for
the federal child pornography laws supported its conclusion that
clothed exhibitions of the genitals are proscribed under the Act.324
The court of appeals noted that the Supreme Court's decision in
New York v. Ferber "relaxe[d] the Miller obscenity standard when
pornographic materials depict minors since the government's inter-
est in 'safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of
a minor' is 'compelling.' ' 325 The court of appeals also stated that
the "use of children as subjects in pornographic materials is harm-
ful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child,"
and that the psychological effect of visually recording such exploi-
tation of the child is "devastating and its elimination is of 'surpass-
ing importance.' 3 2
6
The court explained that, since the child's exploitation is per-
manently recorded, the pornography may haunt the child for a
lifetime because he or she will be aware that the depiction is circu-
lating throughout the masses.327 The court' also explained that the
offense is committed against the privacy and dignity of the child
and results in the exploitation of the child's vulnerability:
Human dignity is offended by the pornographer. American
Law does not protect all human dignity; legally, an adult
can consent to its diminishment. When a child is made the
target of the pornographer-photographer, the statute will not
suffer the insult to the human spirit, that the child should be
treated as a thing.3 21
The court of appeals noted that "controlling the production and
323. Knox, 32 F.3d at 749.
324. Id.
325. Id. (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982)).
326. Id. at 749 (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757).
327. Id. (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 n. 10).
328. United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 750 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting United States
v. Weigand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987)).
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dissemination of child pornography is of paramount importance
since pedophiles often use child pornography to seduce other chil-
dren into performing sexual acts. 329 Furthermore, the court found
that in order to vindicate the government's compelling interest in
protecting children from exploitation through pornographic materi-
als, the "arsenal of available enforcement mechanisms is more
extensive" than when the subjects of pornographic materials are
adults.330  The court of appeals considered the facts of the Knox
case, along with the rationale underlying the Act and concluded
that the Act applies to the sorts of non-nude depictions of children
at issue in Knox.
33 1
The court of appeals next rejected Knox's argument that the
Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Villard332 mandated ex-
posure of the genitals to find a violation of the Act. In Villard, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that
"more than mere nudity" is required for a violation of the Act.333
In Knox, the court of appeals concluded that this requirement did
not contemplate nudity as a prerequisite for a violation of the Act,
but instead stated the "obvious principle that nudity alone is insuf-
329. Id. at 750 (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990)).
330. Id. at 750. Compare Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (statute
prohibiting private possession of obscenity found unconstitutional) with Osborne v. Ohio,
495 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (upheld statute criminalizing at-home possession of child
pornography due to compelling interest to protect children).
331. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 750 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL 512613 (U.S.
Jan. 17, 1995). The court of appeals stated:
The harm Congress attempted to eradicate by enacting the child pornog-
raphy laws is present when a photographer unnaturally focuses on a minor
child's clothed genital area with the obvious intent to produce an image sex-
ually arousing to pedophiles. The child is treated as a sexual object and the
permanent record of this embarrassing and humiliating experience produces the
same detrimental effects to the mental health of the child as a nude portrayal.
The rationale underlying the statute's proscription applies equally to any lascivi-
ous exhibition of the genitals or pubic area whether these areas are clad or
completely exposed.
Id. (emphasis added).
332. 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1989). The Villard case dealt with depictions of a male
child whose genitals were sticking out and exposed through the leg of his shorts. Id.
333. Id. at 121.
1994] PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 221
ficient to constitute a lascivious exhibition. 334
The court of appeals also addressed Knox's argument that the
court's reliance on Villard in its prior opinion was misplaced."'
Knox argued that the determination of whether a certain depiction
visually displays a child's genitals is a threshold question, whereas
evaluation of the Dost factors is relevant for the subsequent deter-
mination of whether such a depiction is lascivious. 336  The court
noted its previous reliance on Villard and stated that it had con-
cluded that the case was supportive of its interpretation in Knox
because "inclusion of the fourth Dost factor, 'whether the child is
fully or partially clothed, or nude,' seemed to 'rest[ ] on the im-
plicit assumption that a clothed exhibition of the genitals is crimin-
alized under the statute.' ' 337  Upon reconsideration, the court of
appeals agreed with Knox and the Arvin court338 that the inquiry
into whether the depiction visually exhibits the genitals is a "thres-
hold determination not necessarily guided by the Dost factors. 339
However, the court concluded that the Dost factors were not com-
pletely irrelevant to this threshold determination. 340 The court also
concluded that, although the fourth Dost factor might not provide
support for its interpretation of the Act, it was "clearly not incon-
sistent with that interpretation., 341
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals concluded that the
Act requires no nudity or discemability of the child's genitals or
pubic area, and that the statutory language is clear and unambigu-
334. Knox, 32 F.3d at 750.
335. Id.
336. Id. (quoting United States v. Arvin, 900 F.2d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1024 (1991)).
337. Id. (citing United States v. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 823 (3d Cir. 1992)).
338. In United States v. Arvin, the defendant was convicted of knowingly mailing
photographs of young girls, shown nude with their genitals exposed. 900 F.2d 1385, 1387
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024 (1991). The court stated that the jury had to find
that the pictures visually depicted the minors' genitals or pubic area as a threshold deter-
mination before considering whether they were lascivious. Id. at 1391.
339. United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 751 (3rd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL
512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995).
340. Id.
341. Id.
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ous.342 The court also concluded that the rule of lenity should not
apply in Knox in order "to defeat the clear intent of Congress to
prohibit the possession of child pornography to the maximum ex-
tent allowable under the Constitution. 343
The Justice Department recently filed a Supreme Court brief in
response to Knox's request for appeal. 3" The brief, signed by
Attorney General Janet Reno, rather than by any member of the
Solicitor General's office, changed the position taken in the govern-
ment's second brief.3 45  In an accompanying statement, Reno
"praised as sound and persuasive the interpretation [of the Act]




343. Id. (citing National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Schiedler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 806
(1994)). See also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) ("the rule of lenity
is not to be applied where to do so would conflict with the implied or expressed intent
of Congress"). The court also rejected Knox's contention that, because his prosecution
and conviction for violating the Act was the first involving materials containing no nudity,
the rule of lenity must be applied. Knox, 32 F.3d at 751 n.15. The court explained that
this contention misconceived the object of the rule and would produce an absurd result.
Id. "First, the application of the rule of lenity is not dependent whatsoever on whether
there have been successful prosecutions under the statute at issue." Id. (comparing
Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 662-663 (1994)). Second, the court stated that,
if it were to agree with Knox's argument, "then the government would never be able to
successfully prosecute a person for violating a newly enacted criminal statute, nor would
the government be able to successfully proceed under a theory different from that which
has yielded convictions in the past." Id.
The court of appeals also concluded that its interpretation of the Act does not render
the statute unconstitutionally overbroad. Knox, 32 F.3d at 751. The court's rationale
concerning this issue is essentially identical to the rationale of its previous opinion. See
supra notes 219-221 and accompanying text.
344. See Greenhouse, supra note 27, at A15.
345. Id.
346. Id.
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ACT AND ITS APPLICATION IN KNOX
A. Congressional Intent, Legislative History, and Statutory
Language Support Prosecutions of Certain Depictions of
Clothed Children
Knox is the first case to address instances of child pornography
in which the children's pubic areas are opaquely covered. Appar-
ently, the type of child exploitation found in the Nather
tapes-' films depicting clothed children-is a new trend.347  A
source close to the prosecutors who charged Knox in 1991 stated
that these films were a type of new "pseudo-pornography," and, to
some commentators, appeared to be legal under an interpretation of
the existing statute.3 4' As the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit correctly affirmed, however, the statute's lan-
guage, combined with its legislative history and the stated congres-
sional intent to protect children from sexual exploitation, provide
an interpretation of the Act which criminalizes the types of depic-
tions at issue in Knox.
The court of appeals correctly concluded that the statutory term,
"lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area," does not ex-
plicitly state that prohibited depictions of child pornography require
nudity or visibility of the genitals or pubic area. As the court not-
ed, although it may be unclear from the legislative history whether
in 1977 Congress addressed depictions which did not involve nudi-
ty or visibility,349 there is no indication that Congress specifically
limited the statute's applicability only to depictions involving nudi-
ty or visibility.
347. Phelps, supra note 291, at 21. "[B]ecause of tough enforcement, commercial
production of child pornography had been almost nonexistent for more than a decade,
when [Nather] started making the pseudo-pornography in the Knox case." Id.
348. Id.
349. Presumably, this is because child pornographers were not as creative one or two
decades ago, and they had no reason to be. Prior to the 1977 Act, explicit depictions of
children engaged in a wide variety of sexual activities were readily available within more
than 260 different publications catering to pedophiles. S. REP. No. 438, supra note 39,
at 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 43. Even with the 1977 Act in effect, child
pornographers were able to create child pornography with impunity provided they did not
meet the Miller test for obscenity. See supra note 50. Only in 1984 did Congress amend
the statute to remove the obscenity requirement. See supra note 101.
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Although there may have been a lack of legislative clarity in
drafting the statute, the congressional intent behind the federal child
pornography laws undoubtedly was to prevent children from being
sexually exploited by child pornographers."' Other indicia not
utilized by the Third Circuit on remand concerning the legislative
history and the language of the statute itself further support the
court's interpretation of the Act. Although the court correctly re-
fused to rely on recent legislative resolutions concerning the Act
and the Knox case because of their unreliability,35' the court could
have considered the legislative history of the 1984 amendments
contained in The Child Protection Act to bolster the analysis for its
interpretation and rationale based on congressional aim. First, Con-
gress' primary goal-to wipe out the child pornography industry in
an effort to protect children-was emphasized by almost all of the
members of Congress who testified at the 1977 Hearings and in
support of the 1984 amendments. 2 Furthermore, it is important
to recognize that "the main thrust of the Act is to protect children
and punish child abuse; it is not so much a measure created to
penalize pornography for its own sake. 353
In addition, the language used in the Act clearly demonstrates
Congress' intent to eradicate the child pornography industry by
outlawing all forms of child pornography. The term "simulated"
remains in the Act to modify each of the definitions of "sexually
explicit conduct," including "lascivious exhibition of the genitals
or pubic area." 354 During the congressional hearings for the 1984
amendments to the 1977 Act, two proposals suggested defining the
term "simulated" in the 1984 amendments. 5  Several lawyers and
members of Congress disagreed with these proposals and instead
350. See 123 CoNG. REC. 33,056 (1977) (the primary purpose of the child pornogra-
phy laws is to protect children from exploitation).
351. See supra note 322.
352. See, e.g., 1977 Hearings, supra note 40, at 74-75; 123 CoNG. REC. 33,043
(1977); 123 CONG. REC. 33,048-49 (1977); 129 CoNG. REC. 7198 (1984).
353. Weiss, supra note 33, at 330-332. Representative Hughes of New Jersey, a
sponsor of the 1984 Act, specifically stated that "this is a child protection law, a law
which punishes child abuse, not pornography." 129 CONG. REC. H9780 (1983).
354. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
355. See supra notes 92-93, 107.
[Vol. 5:167
1994] PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 225
stated that the term "simulated" should be left undefined in order
to prevent loopholes that imaginative pornographers might find.356
Senator Grassley agreed that the revised statute should preserve the
term "simulated" without definition in order to thwart the efforts
of child pornographers. 3" Senator Marriot also agreed that the
term simulated should remain undefined and emphasized that those
who would exploit children in the production of pornography
"would be very willing to take advantage of any loophole they
thought might be available to avoid prosecution. 358
Congress heeded these warnings and refused to limit the term
"simulated" to a precise definition when it enacted the 1984 amen-
dments to the statute.359 Concerned about potential loopholes with-
in the statute and intent on creating stringent legislation to wipe out
the child pornography industry, Congress also refused to provide
an affirmative defense for materials with literary, artistic, scientific,
social, or educational value. 36° Thus, the Act's proscription against
depictions containing simulated lascivious exhibition of the genital
or pubic area applies to certain panty-flashing videos, such as those
at issue in Knox. Such videos, by their nature, contain simulated
lascivious exhibitions of the genital or pubic areas of children and,
therefore, sexually exploit children in violation of the Act.
The court of appeals properly rejected the application of the
rule of lenity to Knox. Although Knox claimed that he did not
have fair warning that his conduct was criminal and that the rule
of lenity should have applied in his case, the rule of lenity is not
applicable unless there is a "grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in
the language and structure of the Act," 361 such that even after a
court has "seize[d] everything from which aid can be derived,"
including the language and structure, legislative history, and moti-
356. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
358. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
361. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) (quoting Huddleston v.
United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974)).
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vating policies of the statute, it is still "left with an ambiguous
statute. 362
The Supreme Court has never required "that every permissible
application of a statute be expressly referred to in its legislative
history. ' 363 Rather, the Supreme Court has rejected narrow inter-
pretations of statutes when they are found to be "inconsistent With
Congress' general purpose" behind the Act.364 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has stated that, "where Congress has manifested its
intent, we may not manufacture ambiguity in order to defeat that
intent., 365 As expressed above, the Third Circuit reasonably inter-
preted the term "lascivious exhibition" to apply to depictions of
clothed children in certain instances. Although its drafters did not
mention depictions of children who are not nude, the legislative
history of the Child Protection Act contains numerous statements
by members of Congress of their intention to close any loopholes
that pornographers might find in order to evade the Act.366 More-
over, as the court of appeals correctly concluded, Congress' general
purpose and motivating policies in legislating against child pornog-
raphy are consistent with the finding that Knox's conduct was a
violation of the Act.
B. The Dost Factors Apply When Determining "Lascivious
Exhibitions" of Clothed Children
1. The Dost Factors As Applied to the Facts in Knox
The court of appeals properly utilized the Dost factors in Knox.
The court of appeals noted that the question of whether the depic-
tion at issue visually exhibits the genitals or pubic area is a thresh-
old determination under Arvin. It significantly concluded, however,
that the Dost factors are not completely irrelevant to this threshold
362. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (quoting United States v.
Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.)).
363. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
364. id. at 113.
365. Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980).
366. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
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determination. 367  Consideration of the multi-factor Dost test is
crucial to a complete analysis of the coverage of the Act, and Dost
provides an interpretation that will effectively counteract the in-
creasing creativity of child pornographers who attempt to betray
Congress' intention of protecting children against sexual exploita-
tion.
In the Dost case, the court set forth six factors to be considered
when determining whether a depiction constitutes a lascivious exhi-
bition.3 61 The court of appeals properly applied these factors to
Knox in conjunction with its newly articulated standard: that a
"'lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area' of a minor
requires only that-the material depict some 'sexually explicit con-
duct' by the minor subject which appeals to the lascivious interest
of the intended audience. 3 69 This is an appropriate interpretation
of the. statute because very few images "where a minor's [pubic]
area is not fully exposed- will constitute a lascivious exhibition
since the fact that the child is clothed is a factor militating against
a finding of lascivious. '370 The totality of the factors present in the
Nather tapes-the minor's abbreviated attire, the spreading and
extending of their legs, their dancing or gyrating in a fashion indic-
ative of adult sexual relations, and the tapes' appeal to the lascivi-
ous interest of an audience of pedophiles---demonstrated that they
were prohibited child pornography under the Act.
Specific application of other Dost factors, as well as other rele-
vant factors, to the Nather tapes also would have been appropriate.
For instance, the focus of the depictions in the Nather tapes is
obviously on the child's pubic area, despite its being covered by
clothing. In addition, photographic or videotaped depictions of
367. United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 751 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL
512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995).
368. United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), affd sub nom.
United States v. Weigand, 816 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987);
see supra note 151 and accompanying text.
369. Knox, 32 F.3d at 747.
370. United States v. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 823 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S.
Ct. 2926, vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993), aff'd, 32 F.3d 733 (3d Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 1994 WL 512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995).
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children do not normally contain scenes consisting of focusing and
zooming in on his or her clothed genital or pubic area for extended
periods of time. These types of depictions may suggest a sexual
coyness to the viewer, even without the child dancing in a sexual
manner, since the child is allowing him- or herself to be filmed in
such an unnatural manner. Moreover, in addition to the Nather
brochures' assertions,37' the fact that some parts of the tapes fea-
tured a female child's body from the navel to the thighs 37 2 demon-
strates that these depictions were intended and designed to elicit a
sexual response in the intended viewer.
This conclusion should also take into consideration other factors
not mentioned by the court, but which seem relevant in this case
as required under the Dost test. Such factors include: the time the
photographer spent zooming up their skirts to view the children's
pubic areas; and the overall content of the tapes, including the
camera zooming in on the exposed nipple of one child. In addi-
tion, these children were apparently instructed by someone off-
camera to lift up their knees to allow the camera full view of their
panties.373 The contents of Knox's videotapes, therefore, meet the
Dost test and support a finding of a "lascivious exhibition."
2. The Third Circuit Properly Rejected the Justice Depart-
ment's "Posing or Acting Lasciviously" Requirement as
Inappropriate
The Justice Department's requirement in its second Supreme
Court brief that the child must be posing or acting lasciviously
would inappropriately limit the opportunities to prosecute child
pornographers under the Act. Although the Act requires a finding
of lasciviousness, a term to be applied by the courts but purposely
left undefined,374 the court of appeals correctly concluded that the
Dost factors do not hinge on the intent of the child subject.375
371. See supra note 191.
372. United States Brief (Days) at 5.
373. Supreme Court Brief of National Law Center for Children at 10; see supra note
193 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
375. United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 747 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL
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In addition, there is case law interpreting the Act that the court
of appeals could have utilized to further support its rationale that
lasciviousness is not solely dependent on the sexual posing or act-
ing of the child depicted.376 For instance, a depiction of a child
who is sleeping377 or drugged can still be illegal under the Act if
the camera is focused on the child's genital or pubic area or an
adult or another child is touching those areas. The child depicted
in this instance could not be said to have posed or acted for these
pictures, yet the offense to the dignity and privacy rights of the
child filmed in such a way is evident.. Such depictions still consti-
tute the sexual exploitation of the child under the Act. The Justice
Department's new "posing" requirement would have wrongly un-
dermined worthy prosecutions under the Act.
The court of appeals, however, seems to have failed to account
for depictions of children who may be filmed for Nather- type
tapes while sleeping or drugged. There may be a future issue
raised as to whether such a depiction could meet the Third Cir-
cuit's newly-articulated requirement that the material "depict some
'sexually explicit conduct' by the minor which appeals to the las-
civious interest of the intended audience. 378 Although a depiction
of a clothed sleeping or drugged child which lasciviously exhibited
that child genitals would be rare, future courts should recognize the
possibility. The child in such a depiction is not engaged in any
"sexually explicit conduct" intentionally or otherwise, but the
courts could find that the material depicts the child in such a man-
ner because of his or her position, setting, etc.
C. Policy Considerations: Protecting Our Children
The court of appeals correctly noted the significant policy rea-
sons, recognized by the United States Supreme Court, for prohibit-
512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995).
376. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
377. See United States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241, 242 (10th Cir. 1989) (depictions of
sleeping child whose nude lower body was photographed constituted child pornography);
see supra notes 169-174 and accompanying text.
378. Knox, 32 F.3d at 747.
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ing the type of videotapes found in Knox's possession. The Su-
preme Court has traditionally afforded greater latitude to the regu-
lation of pornographic depictions of children because of the com-
pelling interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-
being of minors, even in the area of constitutionally protected
rights.3 79 In Osborne v. Ohio, the Court noted that these materials
are later used by pedophiles to seduce other children into sexual
activity by a process known as "desensitizing." '38 Children who
are reluctant to participate in sexual activity or pose for a porno-
graphic picture can sometimes be convinced by viewing depictions
of other children participating in it.38' :
The Third Circuit correctly recognized that children suffer guilt
and emotional trauma from participating in depictions such as those
contained in the Nather tapes. This trauma is exacerbated by the
fear of knowing that the depictions are circulating throughout the
masses. 382 Whether these children's genitals and pubic areas are
covered or not, the children will suffer the psychological, mental,
and emotional harms that the Act and the Court's conclusions in
379. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982). In Ferber, the Court
noted that "[a] democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-round-
ed growth of young people into full maturity as citizens," in concluding that child pornog-
raphy is a form of unprotected speech. Id. at 757 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 168 (1944)). See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upheld
New York Law protecting children from exposure to non-obscene literature); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (government's interest in the well-being of its youth
justified special treatment of indecent broadcasting received by adults as well as children);
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (prohibition against possession of child pornogra-
phy complies with First Amendment and is not overbroad).
380. 495 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1990); see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 649 (dis-
cussing the desensitizing process used by pedophiles to seduce children into sexual activi-
ty with them or to pose for pictures). In New York v. Ferber, the Court noted that chil-
dren who participate in the making of child pornography are often molested by adults in
conjunction with the making of these materials and are unable to develop healthy relation-
ships as they reach maturity. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758-59 n.9.
381. FINAL REPORT, supia note 1, at 649.
382. "A child who has posed for a camera must go through life knowing that the
recording is circulating with the mass distribution system for child pornography .... [hie
must carry with him the distressful feeling that his act has been recorded for all to see."
Shouvlin, supra note 33, at 545. See also People v. Spargo, 431 N.E.2d 27, 31-32 (Il1.
App. 1982) (noting that the continuing fear of exposure is as damaging as the initial
sexual exploitation); FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 650. "Each time the pornography
is exchanged the children involved are victimized again." Id. at 651.
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Ferber and Osborne sought to prevent.8 3
A "lascivious exhibition" is difficult to define with clarity.384
Thirty years ago Justice Stewart experienced similar difficulty
when attempting to define obscenity.385 In Miller v. California,386
a majority of the Supreme Court finally agreed on a standard to be
used to evaluate whether adult pornography is obscene and set
forth a complex and restrictive test.387 Such restrictiveness, howev-
er, need not exist when the sexual objects depicted are children.388
The court of appeals' emphasis on United States v. Weigand,389 and
Judge Noonan's remarks regarding the privacy and dignity rights
of the child390 are significant in carrying out the congressional aim
and motivating policies behind the Act. The Act was designed to
protect children by prohibiting their sexual exploitation, and thus,
the court's consideration of these dignity and privacy rights of the
child was valid.39'
Although the court in Weigand was concerned with a depiction
of a nude child, the rationale applied in Weigand is also applicable
383. See United States v. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 821 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113
S. Ct. 2926, vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993), aff'd, 32 F.3d 733 (3d Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL 512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995). Although the trauma and
embarrassment experienced by a child when the child's genital and pubic areas are cov-
ered may be less than that of the child who is depicted nude in a "lascivious exhibition,"
the sexual exploitation of the child is still present in such a depiction. Thus, the govern-
mental interest in protecting children from being used in such depictions is the same. See
supra note 331 and accompanying text.
384. See United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 120-22 (3rd Cir. 1989).
385. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, stated, "I shall
not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced
within [the Court's] shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligi-
bly doing so. But I know it when I see it. Jacobellis,.378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
386. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
387. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
388. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982).
389. 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987). The Ninth
Circuit stated that the harms to the child-psychological, mental, and emotional-are
collectively "the consequential damages that flow from the trespass against the dignity of
the child." Id. at 1245.
390. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
391. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
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to depictions of clothed children, such as those in the tapes at issue
in Knox. The courts must address any depiction involving the
sexual exploitation of children and should apply the Act to encom-
pass Knox's tapes because the Act will not tolerate the offense to
the child.
Additionally, reason and common sense mandate that such
depictions be recognized as sexually exploitative. Children are
made aware at a very early age that their genitals and pubic areas
are private areas of the body and that such conduct is socially un-
acceptable. A child coerced by an adult photographer to engage in
such depictions presumably will feel violated, ashamed, and victim-
ized. Congress, in enacting the federal child pornography laws,
and the Supreme Court, in Ferber and Osborne, sought to protect
the child from this type of "invasion of the child's vulnerability."392
Failure to hold the depictions at issue in Knox to fall within the
parameters of the Act would, in effect, sanction the type of sexual
exploitation evident in the Nather tapes, and would encourage pro-
ducers and distributors to perpetuate the sexual abuse of children.
3 93
Some argue that the Third Circuit's interpretation of the Act is
overbroad and infringes on the First Amendment rights of advertis-
ers, artists, film producers, and persons with innocuous photographs
or videos of children. 394 However, the adoption of this interpreta-
tion in future cases does not appear to be as troublesome as some
commentators presume. The Supreme Court has "insisted that the
overbreadth involved be 'substantial' before the statute involved
[is] invalidated on its face."395 Parents and clothing advertisers do
not, as a regular course of conduct, photograph or videotape the
pubic area of their children or child models, respectively, so as to
produce a depiction that can fairly be said to be a graphic and
392. See United States v. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 821 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113
S. Ct. 2926, vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993), aft'd, 32 F.3d 733 (3d Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL 512613 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995) (citing Weigand, 812 F.2d at
1245).
393. See Supreme Court Brief of National Law Center for Children at 22-27.
394. See supra notes 293-294 and accompanying text.
395. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769.
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unnatural focus or close-up of these areas.396 Film producers also
will not be unduly burdened since using body doubles for scenes
involving children engaged in "sexually explicit conduct" as de-
fined by § 2256 is already an acceptable practice in the industry.397
In addition, as the court of appeals emphasized in its decision,
the requirement of lasciviousness within the Act will always be the
limiting principle when determining whether a particular depiction
constitutes a "lascivious exhibition." The Act's prohibition against
lascivious exhibitions of the genital or pubic areas of clothed chil-
dren, when utilized on a case-by-case basis, has a legitimate reach
which overshadows its arguably impermissible applications. It is
the responsibility of future courts to protect children from the har-
mful effects of being sexually exploited by pornographers in accor-
dance with the primary purpose underlying the Act. The Third
Circuit has articulated the appropriate interpretation of the Act to
combat this new wave in child pornography. Adoption of the
Third Circuit's interpretation by future courts will stamp out the
Nather-type of child pornography in its infancy, rather than permit
pornographers and those who buy, reproduce, sell or exchange
child pornography, such as Knox, to frustrate the intended purpose
of the Act and sexually exploit countless children.
CONCLUSION
How can children whose pubic areas are covered be sexually
exploited in visual depictions? The Nather tapes speak for them-
selves and illustrate just how inventive child pornographers can be
in trying to evade federal child pornography laws. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, has articu-
lated the proper interpretation of the Act based on its' language,
396. Supreme Court Brief of National Law Center for Children at 13.
397. Josephine R. Potuto, Stanley + Ferber = The Constitutional Crime of At-Home
Child Pornography Possession, 76 KY. L.J. 15, 42 n. 112 (1987-1988) (discussing the use
of body doubles by major motion picture companies, particularly noting the use of a body
double for Brooke Shields' role in The Blue Lagoon); see also Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763
& n.16. (stating that a person over the statutory age who perhaps looked younger could
be utilized in the making of scenes which could be considered illegal under the Act).
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legislative history, and motivating policies. These factors demon-
strate that the Act prohibits the unnatural, extended close-up depic-
tions of a child's clothed pubic area contained in the sexually ex-
ploitative Nather tapes, and it does so without unconstitutional
overbreadth. Future courts should adopt the Third Circuit's inter-
pretation of the Act to both protect children and curb this new
child pornography. It is only by utilizing this interpretation of the
Act that the courts will succeed in carrying out Congress' intent to
protect children against sexual exploitation.
Annemarie J. Mazzone
